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Abstract 
While historians have approached the process of popular democracies‟ absorption into the 
Soviet system at the end of the Second World War by stressing political and economic 
relations within the decision-making structures, the urban spaces produced during this 
interval, as sites of social interaction, remained under-researched. In Romania, the project 
conducted in Hunedoara between 1947 and 1954 illustrates the extent to which the 
Romanian communist state was aware of the urban space‟s potential for social 
manipulation, as well as the strategies this authority undertook to employ politically the 
formative function of the built environment. The thesis revolves around three main 
questions: What did modernization mean for Romanian society by the end of World War 
II? To what degree did the attempts of Stalinization manage to impose on Romanian 
society the Soviet Union‟s cultural values and principles? And how can studying urban 
architecture tell us more about these topics? Drawing on newspaper and archival 
materials, the thesis concludes that inside the communist system, the ability to define 
“modernity” much less bringing it into being, depended on whether political elites and 
the party could provide institutional unity and coherent decision-making.  
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I 
Introduction  
An experiment conducted by Kevin Lynch during the 1970s encouraged participants to 
imagine their urban surroundings by creating descriptions and sketches, and by 
performing imaginary trips into their city. The research concluded that references to the 
city‟s physical world identify trails (streets, walkways, channels, and railways), 
boundaries (shores, walls), districts, nodes (junctions or squares, street corners), and 
milestone (buildings, signs, and other physical objects). These represented mental forms 
shaped by the citizens‟ continuous controlled movement inside the city.1 Lynch argued 
that emotional security, visual enjoyment and a “potential depth and intensity of urban 
experience” were given by the degree of clarity of a built environment.2 In his 
experiment, Lynch reduced the urban space‟s significance to a “perceptual knowledge of 
physical form,” and emphasized attempts to “impose some form of imagining order onto 
the urban fabric” by focusing upon introspections in the human mind.3 However, as other 
researchers in the field of urban space have pointed out, the experiment‟s conclusions 
“tend to ignore that such a picture is socially produced and its nature, as a representation 
of social processes, is ideological.”4 Accordingly, what individuals perceive as legible 
signs inside the urban perimeter reflects, in fact, the space commissioner‟s long-term 
visions. Therefore, how urban meanings reached the population‟s consciousness rested 
upon the political authority‟s manipulative and interpretative strategies. Conveying 
readable urban symbols out of local, regional, and national symbols, state authorities and 
                                                 
1
 Kevin Lynch, “The Image of the City and Its Elements,” in The City Image, ed. Richard T. LeGates and 
Frederic Stout (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 478-83; see also Ali Madanipour, Design of 
Urban Space. An Inquiry into a Socio-Spatial Process (Newcastle: John Wiley and Sons Press, 1996), 67-8. 
2
 Lynch, “The Image of the City,” 478.  
3
 Madanipour, Design of Urban Space, 68.  
4
 Ibid., 69. 
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planning structures could speculate upon the substantial formative capacity of a built 
environment and could assemble, for the purposes of legitimation, grand narratives that 
would imagine modern nations and communities.  
This research project questions the extent to which a political regime, namely the 
Romanian communist state, was aware of the urban space‟s potential for social 
manipulation, as well as the strategies this authority undertook to employ politically the 
formative function of the built environment. At the end of the 1940s, the Romanian city 
Hunedoara had 7,000 inhabitants. By the end of World War II, when the Romanian 
communists had to integrate the country‟s program of industrial development into the 
Soviet economic system, the old settlement could not provide enough dwelling facilities 
for the population to be employed in the local steel plant.
5
 Between 1947 and 1954, three 
successive phases (1947-1948, 1949-1950, and 1951-1954) were planned to develop the 
city spectacularly and raise the population to 60,000 over the following twenty years. The 
“Garden City” project, designed and built between 1947 and 1948, and the socialist-
realist project, constructed between 1951 and 1954, were the most important. This thesis 
describes how Hunedoara was built. 
The project identifies the state‟s investment in the urban enterprise with the 
“aesthetic mechanisms of Stalinization”6 used to create an imagined socialist urban 
                                                 
5
 R. Marcus, “Sistematizarea oraşului Hunedoara,” Arhitectura 2 (1959): 8; for a history of the local steel 
plant, see N. Chindler, V.Dâncan, I.Dobrin, R.Păţan, S.Popa, Combinatul siderurgic Hunedoara. 1884-
1974 (Bucharest: Ed. Academiei), 1974; Ludovic Bathory, Stefan Csucsuja, Gheorghe Iancu, Marcel 
Stirban, Dezvoltarea întreprinderilor metalurgice din Transilvania. 1919-1940 (Cluj Napoca, 2003). 
6
 The thesis uses the concept of “Stalinization” to designate how by the end of the Second World War, the 
Eastern European countries were absorbed into the Soviet sphere and exposed to the incoming ideology 
associated with the rule of Stalin. As such, it “can be defined as a set of tenets, policies and practices 
instituted by the Soviet government during the years in which Stalin was in power, 1928-53. It was 
characterized by extreme coercion employed for the purpose of economic and social transformation. 
Among the particular feature of Stalinism were the abolition of private property and free trade; the 
collectivization of agriculture; a planned economy and rapid industrialization, and terror.” See David 
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community in communist Romania.
7
 Whereas, according to Soviet requirements, 
building the city around a heavy-industry site was a necessary step in the process of 
economic development, the project also brought to bear an extraordinary concentration 
and deployment of visual tactics and strategies. Propaganda, mass media campaigns, and 
building legislation approached the urban space from different perspectives. Submitted in 
order to create long-standing images of socialist success, these strategies manipulated the 
architectural significance of the built environment based on citizens‟ urban experiences 
set by street plans, city views, and historical narratives. Accordingly,   
 
… the Stalinist system generally, and its art particularly, aspired to create 
a utopia of total communication, the utopia of a language that would be 
mono-semantic, terminological, fully adequate to reality. Therefore, the 
permanent concern with clarity reflected the concerns and objectives of 
the system to address the understanding of the environment.
8
  
 
This concern with clarity, juxtaposed socialist-realist rhetoric with mechanisms 
that, by the end of the Second World War, assisted the Romanian communist state‟s 
program, which defined itself as modernizing.
9
 The project revolves around three main 
questions. What did modernization mean for Romanian society by the end of World War 
II? To what degree did the attempts of Stalinization manage to impose on Romanian 
society the Soviet Union‟s cultural values and principles? And how can studying urban 
architecture tell us more about these topics?  
                                                                                                                                                 
Hoffmann, “Introduction: Interpretations of Stalinism,” in Stalinism, The Essential Reading, ed. David 
Hoffmann (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 2.   
7
 For a theoretical discussion on the constructions of the national identities through the political decision-
making, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London and New York: Verso, 1991). 
8
 Leonid Heller, “A World of Prettiness: Socialist Realism and Its Aesthetic Categories,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly 3 (1995): 697. 
9
 See Stelian Tănase, Elite şi Societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej 1948–1965 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 
1998); Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1991). 
 4 
By engaging micro-history in a parallel process of revealing larger patterns of 
cultural production, the thesis aims to uncover a pattern on Romania‟s absorption into the 
Soviet orbit. Hunedoara is located in the historical province of Transylvania. For 
centuries under Austrian and Hungarian rule, then integrated into the Romanian state by 
the end of World War I, the province‟s cultural specificity synthesized a Central 
European tradition of Gothic and Baroque architecture. Furthermore, the two decades 
following World War I created an artistic tradition in line with European modernist 
trends. Therefore, it becomes interesting to map out how, after the end of World War II, 
the local cultural tradition of the place was adapted to the socialist-realist rhetoric stating 
that culture should be necessarily “national in form and socialist in content.”  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 View of the Hunedoara Steel Plant during the 1960s. Courtesy Constantin Gaina. 
 5 
As such, a decades-long process of ideological and economic transformations during 
which Hunedoara grew to be imagined as a model socialist site marked the forceful 
communist drive to gaining legitimacy through the use and abuse of “national form into 
socialist content” and anchor the rhetorical aim of “revolutionary future” into the 
metaphorical permanence of history. While concerned with how the city was built 
between 1947 and 1954, the paper argues that the intense dual engagement with both 
creation and control of architectural images, as practiced by the communist authorities in 
Hunedoara, revealed an ambivalence about Romania‟s new socialist-realist culture that 
was most noticeable in the proposed building solutions.  
On one hand, ideologically, the cultural and propaganda institutions, the 
Communist Party‟s mass-media structures and “The Romanian Friendship Society for 
Strengthening the Relations with the Soviet Union” (ARLUS) assimilated socialist-realist 
rhetoric effortlessly. To this, the tided connections with the Soviet Union played a 
significant part. As early as 1946, the mass media, including the architects‟ monthly 
bulletin, presented extensive title lists of Soviet books available for reading at the 
ARLUS library.
10
  
On the other hand, architecturally, the designers encountered difficulties in 
converting the Soviet message to Romanian reality, mostly because of the nature of their 
profession. For instance, in 1946, while concerned with the issue of post-war national 
reconstruction, Gustav Gusti mentioned three mandatory steps in the building process: 
research, planning, and execution. Accordingly, building a house, not to mention a city, 
would require a long-term effort, sophisticated planning methods, and rigorous 
                                                 
10
 Buletinul Societăţii Arhitecţilor din România 8 (August-October 1946): 17-8; Forum, Buletinul Uniunii 
Sindicatelor de Artişti, Scriitori si Ziarişti din România 1 (January 1947): 2-3.  
 6 
legislation, which would span the overall building process over several years.
11
 
Architecture was slower to change and in spite of its attempts to accommodate official 
requirements, former constructive patterns and ideologies, influenced strongly by 
Western modernist influences of the 1920s and 1930s or Central European housing 
traditions, were more dominant and even more efficient in creating the built environment. 
Within the local conditions, the existing culture‟s interaction with the arriving rhetoric of 
socialist realism provides the historian with an excellent example of the manipulation and 
interpretation of local symbolism and its conversion into meaningful political messages. 
The initial juxtaposition of socialist-realist discourse with the “Garden-City” modernist 
buildings by the end of the 1940s, and the subsequent recovery of architecture‟s design 
and symbolism with the construction of the socialist-realist city, during the early 1950s, 
illustrates the interaction of the political dynamic and the building dynamic.  
This thesis examines the process of building the city, and implicitly of 
constructing the communist system, by analyzing how, over a specific time frame, the 
political authorities confiscated, step by step, the built environment‟s production, 
distribution, and reception by institutionalizing the planning process and bringing it under 
the Soviet ideological and institutional shelter. The thesis will show that within the 
Romanian communist system there were serious discrepancies between the official 
content of architectural discourse and its actual materialization and, furthermore, that the 
initial program of socio-political transformation initiated by the communist regime, 
although placed under the sign of modernization, failed because of institutional and 
decisional inconsistencies. The case of Hunedoara tells us much about not only 
                                                 
11
 See, Buletinul Societăţii Arhitecţilor din România 7 (June 1946): 19.  
 7 
architecture and urban planning in communist systems, but also about efficiency, 
financial mismanagement, and political incongruities.  
In general, this topic is not new: similar questions concerning post-war Eastern 
European reconstruction have been asked previously. However, Romania as a specific 
case study remains under-researched. This project aims to focus on how the Romanian 
Communist Party sought locally to fulfill requirements elaborated in Moscow and widely 
distributed throughout the Eastern bloc. This analysis is based on Romanian newspapers 
and magazines published between 1947 and 1954 and documents available in the 
Hunedoara County‟s local and provincial archives. The Archive of the City Hall of 
Hunedoara includes the Executive Committee‟s administrative decisions and city plans, 
development schemes, and blueprints. The County Archives holdings cover extensively 
the Provincial Executive meetings, governmental dispositions, the Propaganda and 
Urbanism department‟s decisions, and, partially, the regional urban development 
schemes. Of course, the nature of these sources is extremely important. The archival 
materials provide insightful data about political and institutional functioning. Newspapers 
published under the communist regime reflected the official discourse and served as 
propaganda instruments; therefore, most of the data available in the press cannot be 
trusted completely, or considered to reveal historical reality with much accuracy. 
Architecture magazines published between 1946 and 1954 uncovered significantly the 
planning interactions, whilst the publications‟ infusion with ideological language over a 
particular period might relate to some changes within the system. Yet, while the sources 
describe governmental decisions and the legislative regulations on one hand, and personal 
interactions or the local bureaucratic apparatus on the other, they do not reveal much 
 8 
about the political initiatives‟ social consequences. Indeed, how individuals placed 
themselves in relation to the new political regime and the new aesthetic was framed by 
the economic politics and widespread human-rights abuses.
12
 To uncover the real image 
of Romanian society by the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, the 
information provided by the primary sources for this project would have to be 
corroborated by personal recollections, diaries, autobiographies, oral histories, and files 
held by the Secret Police Archives. Such research is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Therefore, this project will focus on the official discourse of Stalinization as it applies to 
the building process and not on inhabitants‟ individual reactions to the built environment 
or on the way their lives and interactions were actually shaped by it.  
 
1. Socialist Realism as “Invented Tradition” - Some Methodological Considerations:     
Acknowledging that invented traditions illustrate an attempt to generate an authority, Eric 
Hobsbawm stated that the creation of state identities throughout Europe illustrates how, 
inside a modern system of government, popular consciousness is brought into line with 
what that authority expects the public to believe.   
 
„Invented Tradition‟ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed 
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, 
which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with the past... In short, they are 
                                                 
12
 See Ghiţa Ionescu, Communism in Romania, 1944-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); 
Stephen Fischer Galati, The New Romania: From People’s Democracy to Socialist Republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967); John Michael Montais, Economic Development in Communist 
Romania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs 
and National Development: The Case of Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Robert 
R. King, The History of Romanian Communist Party (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980); Michael 
Shafir, Romania. Politics, Economics, and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (London, 
1985); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, A Political History of Romanian Communism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Robert Levy, Ana Pauker, The Rise and Fall of a Jewish 
Communist (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
 9 
responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old 
situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory 
repetition.
13
   
 
While invented traditions can serve as “evidence in understanding history,” they 
circumscribe a complex set of social and ideological ideals shared by a community within 
a particular context.
14
 In this respect, architecture often serves the state‟s needs when it 
comes to inventing national tradition, because it endows historical monuments and local 
or national heritage with a dual status: “dispensers of knowledge and pleasure placed at 
the disposition of all, and cultural products that are fabricated, packaged, and diffused by 
authorities seeking recognition.”15  
In the Soviet system, socialist-realist rhetoric acted as an invented narrative in the 
service of the state; it can also be seen as having helped to shape the USSR into the kind 
of “imagined community” that Benedict Anderson formally described.16 While the major 
characteristics of the socialist-realist aesthetic will be approached in the next chapter of 
the thesis, the discussion below illustrates how the Soviet state employed the rhetoric for 
political purposes and why it was juxtaposed with the construction of national narratives. 
As Katerina Clark has pointed out, the institutionalization of socialist realism in the 
Soviet Union, in the early 1930s, was a key moment in the country‟s evolution and 
coincided with the start of the nation-building process.
17
 A complex rhetoric elaborated 
during the 1930s, and formalized after the Second World War, socialist realism was “a 
                                                 
13
 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-5. 
14
 Ibid., 2. 
15
 Francoise Choay, The Invention of the Historic Monument (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 143. 
16
 See Anderson, Imagined Communities, op. cit. 
17
 Katerina Clark, “Socialist Realism and the Sacralizing of Space,” in The Landscape of Stalinism, the Art 
and Ideology of Soviet Space, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 2003), 5.  
 10 
political aesthetic from the start.”18 In the Soviet Union, under the precarious economic 
conditions produced by collectivization and the first Five-Year Plan, the rhetoric of 
socialist realism came to counterbalance the reality of material deprivation and political 
repression with the promise of an upcoming radiant experience under socialism. 
Understood as a solution to compensate for the unfulfilled revolutionary utopian dreams 
of the 1920s Russian avant-garde and to express society‟s need for realism and order, 
socialist realism mobilized artists to participate in the socialist construction of the 
modernized future and to depict reality in its revolutionary development, “not as it was, 
but as it would become.”19  
A complex institutional dynamic established the interaction of production, 
distribution, and reception within limits set by the Soviet state.
20
 Thus, socialist realism 
replaced “traditional aesthetic categories” with deeply ideological principles like 
“commitment” to the party‟s line, “reflection” of socio-economic reality as opposed to 
abstractedness, “typicality of characters and situations,” “positive heroes,” “revolutionary 
romanticism,” and “narodnost” (nationality or popular appeal). To sum up, socialist 
realism had to be “national in form and socialist in content.”21 
This slogan transformed and displaced historical images to articulate fragments of 
an approximately and selectively real past in order to serve the social, cultural, and 
political Soviet power. Under Stalin, cultural constructs including the depiction of 
                                                 
18
 Bernice Rosenthal, New Myth, New World: From Nietzsche to Stalinism (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2002), 293.  
19
 Rosenthal, New Myth, 293-4; see also Nina Kolesnikoff and Walter Smyrniw eds., Socialist Realism 
Revisited: Selected Papers from the McMaster Conference (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1994).  
20
 Leonid Heller and Antoine Baudin, „Le realisme socialiste comme organization du champ culturel,” in 
Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique 3 (1993): 309. 
21
 Rosenthal, New Myth, New World, 295.  
 11 
history, became links in “a chain of socio-discursive connections.”22 While socialist 
realism provided the state with the mechanisms to employ politically national myths and 
historical stories, “a new reception strategy had to be formulated in revolutionary culture 
as a consequence of the collapse that occurred when the old culture got a new 
consumer.”23 Whether the target was shaping the individual‟s consciousness or creating 
group solidarities, the rhetoric performed on two levels. Firstly, national appeal would 
uncover what Régine Robin has called “filiations, a discursive memory at work.”24 The 
local heritage‟s symbolic meaning manipulated by institutionalized Soviet systems of 
education and propaganda would allow the individual to discern, within Soviet cultural 
constructs, the “socialist content.”25 Secondly, “national in form” would delineate the 
ideology of the urban space‟s correct use. While national would act as a “catalyst image,” 
individuals‟ conduct would be shaped by reciprocal influences during mass gatherings. 26  
As Manfredo Tafuri has mentioned,   
 
… such recreational-pedagogical experiences were centered on 
exceptional architectural typologies. The ideology of the public is but one 
aspect of the ideology of the city as a productive unit in the proper sense 
of the term, and as an instrument for coordinating the cycle of production-
distribution-consumption.
27
 
 
                                                 
22
 Régine Robin, Socialist Realism: An Impossible Aesthetic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 
xx. 
23
 Evgeni Dobrenko, “The Disaster of Middlebrow Taste, or, Who „Invented‟ Socialist Realism?,” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 3 (1995): 774.  
24
  Robin, Socialist Realism, xx. 
25
 Accordingly, “national audiences were the only legitimate arbiters of socialist art and that the national 
styles were the only possible mediums through which to reach them.” See Greg Castillo, “People at an 
Exhibition,” South Atlantic Quarterly 3 (1995): 730; for the functioning of the propaganda structures, see 
Terry Martin, “Modernization or Neo-traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism” in 
Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 161-185.  
26
  Robin, Socialist Realism, 112. 
27
  See Manfredo Tafuri, “Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology,” in Architecture Theory Since 1968, 
ed. K. Michael Hays (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 17. 
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In the Soviet Union, originally, “national in form and socialist in content” conveyed the 
integration of the various regions of Soviet territory under a centralized authority to 
create a nation-state on the ruins of the former fragmented empire. While the construction 
of the Soviet consciousness had been, by nature, an “exhibitionistic process,” the All 
Union Agricultural Exhibition (VSKhV), inaugurated in Moscow in 1939, initially 
displayed for the Soviet masses the imperial technological development and prosperity on 
one hand and, on the other, the mightiness and variation of artistic national forms of 
expression.
28
 Such spaces created the impression of economic dynamism, productivity, 
happiness and plenty.
29
 Later, “national in form and socialist in content” rhetorically 
supported the exportation of the Soviet system into the newly-established Eastern 
European “popular democracies,” as the USSR called them, and the construction of 
socialism atop the ruins of the war-devastated states.  
Methodologically, the thesis uses the “invented tradition” concept to explain why, 
after the communist takeover by the end of the 1940s, the Romanian communist system 
employed both the socialist-realist architecture and the motto “national in form and 
socialist in content” to construct a national narrative of social and economic 
modernization, which assisted the country‟s absorption process into the Soviet structure. 
According to the communists‟ logic, building Hunedoara was tantamount to building the 
nation. This project revolves around three fundamental historical and theoretical 
problems: the shift from autonomous to state institutionalized planning and cultural 
                                                 
28
 Greg Castillo, “Socialist Realism and Built Nationalism in the Cold War „Battle of the Styles‟,” Centropa 
1 (2001): 86. 
29
 Since the nineteenth century, world‟s fairs played a major role in allowing mass interactions, voyeuristic 
practices, and commercial tourism. By the middle of the century, these displays caused structural changes 
and affected the evolution of forms of housing, social interaction, and human relations. See Christine 
Boyer, The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994); Susan Reid, “Socialist Realism in the Stalinist Terror: the Industry of 
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structures; whether the state had the institutional capacity to produce and distribute 
architectural cultural products skillfully; and how the official discourse imagined the 
urban experience that was to be provided by the built environment would be like.  
 
2. Historiography:  
Generally accepting that socialist realism could not be properly understood unless 
approached in relation to the Russian avant-garde of the 1920s, historians formulated two 
perspectives.
30
 One is the tradition represented by C. Cooke, Hugh Hudson, and V. 
Paperny, which acknowledged the definitive break between avant-garde and modernism 
on the one hand, and totalitarianism on the other.
31
 Another approach defined socialist 
realism as an “artistic method” and approached it from historical, semiological, and 
culturological conceptualizations, which, as Leonid Heller has pointed out, “are not so 
much descriptions as interpretations of the phenomenon of Soviet aesthetics and, as a 
rule, of Soviet culture as a whole.”32 Explaining the “aesthetization of politics” as a 
legitimate drive toward the success of the Soviet project, Groys, Gutkin, Robin, and Clark 
saw in socialist realism a tradition that used the artist‟s true, historically concrete 
depiction of reality in order to substitute the state‟s project to a “conscious strategy of 
                                                 
30
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myth mobilizing creation.”33 These assumptions echoed statements made by cultural 
historians to explain how the Enlightenment thought and the spread of technology 
throughout Europe generated the development of modern society by promoting “social 
intervention in the name of rational social reform” and produced numerous case studies.34  
To stress the impact of cultural practice upon political interaction, historians have 
understood post-war Soviet society from the perspective of the relationships between the 
state and the population, the state and the institutions, and the state and the cultural 
products. Vera Dunham, Jeffrey Brooks, or Richard Stites among others, discuss how 
even after the end of World War II the coming of peacetime, Soviet society continued to 
operate as if mobilized for war. This fact redefined both the function of popular culture 
within the Soviet system and the culture‟s function within the political system.35 Others 
have stressed that the separation between the Cold War‟s international scene and 
domestic affairs could not provide a comprehensive view unless employed as a political 
and socio-economic system in “a serious of logical interactions between several players 
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both within and outside the Soviet Union.”36 Approaching both the ideological and 
institutional inflexibility, and the narrative canonization of postwar Soviet propaganda, 
Timothy Colton and Donald J. Raleigh have emphasized particularly the influence of 
Zhdanov‟s cultural rhetoric.37 The members of the “Lausanne project” formulated a 
similar point of view: analyzing the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe‟s bureaucratic 
interaction, Heller and Baudain argued that the post-war Soviet aesthetic system 
imagined a “vanishing reality,” transforming the 1930s myth of the future “radiant 
reality” into a utopian rhetoric and expressing ideology through institutional solidification 
and a triumphalist style in the arts, architecture, and literature.
38
 
 
 
These interactions have been researched within the context of ideological 
interaction between Moscow and Eastern European states. Aman Andres‟ book 
Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era draws on the 
interaction between modernism and traditionalism, giving attention o the 
institutionalization of architectural practice, professional transformation, and Moscow‟s 
intervention in building decisions.
39
 Essay collections edited by Susan Reid and David 
Crowley have mostly focused on postwar Soviet system in Eastern Europe from the 
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perspective of socialist space and material culture during the Cold War years. Greg 
Castillo‟s research on East German architecture contextualized the transition from 
modernism to socialist realism within Cold War conditions and the Soviet ideology.
40
  
Romanian historiography on Stalinization after the fall of the communist regime 
in 1989 has focused particularly upon political and economic issues. Dennis Deletant, 
Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stelian Tănase, Liviu Târău and recently Nicoleta Ionescu-Gură 
emphasized the impact of Soviet politics upon the internal Romanian politics but 
discussed only tangentially the cultural consequences of Soviet dominance.
41
 However, 
Andi Mihalache, Magda Cârneci, and Augustin Ioan have researched connections 
between cultural production and political decision-making.
42
 Collections of interviews 
with former members of the Communist Party provided interesting perspectives on the 
internal functioning of the organization as well on the personal experiences of the 
leadership. Thus the interviews conducted by Lavinia Betea with Ion Ghoerghe Maurer, 
Gheorghe Apostu and Alexandru Bârlădeanu uncovered somewhat the backstage 
interactions in Romanian political life. Furthermore, memoirs penned by Petru Tugui, 
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former head of the Literature Department during Gheorghiu-Dej‟s regime, reveal 
similarly interesting facts. As far as the architects are concerned, studies on professional 
interaction with the regime have been sparse. Cezar Lăzărescu‟s commemorative book 
edited by his widow Ileana Lăzărescu provides researchers with some biographical 
information, but lacks any critical approach to the events described.
43
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II 
Romania’s Absorption into the Soviet System 
Romania‟s absorption into the Soviet bloc, accomplished by the end of 1947, occurred 
after several years of institutional and ideological dialogue between local communists and 
officials in Moscow. The process involved a variety of mechanisms, both institutional 
and political.
1
 This chapter will briefly describe the political communization of postwar 
Romania; it will then look backward to examine architectural trends in Romania, from 
the 1920s to the imposition of the socialist-realist style in the late 1940s. 
 
1. The Romanian Communist Party: 
Between 1944 and 1948, the state, political parties, and other institutions confronted the 
Soviet model; only the Communist Party assimilated it skillfully. For instance, in 1944, 
the Romanian Workers‟ Party (RWP) had less than 1,000 members. Party leaders carried 
out a rapid enlargement process that Marxist-Leninist jargon calls “the construction of the 
party.”2 By the end of February 1948, the number had spectacularly increased to 800,000. 
However, in 1948, the central leadership initiated a crusade to eliminate careerist 
elements, previous associates with the Iron Guard (a fascist organization), and those in 
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2
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contact with foreign elements. The verification process initially removed from the 
Communist Party 192,000 supposedly hostile elements, and their exclusion augmented 
the sense of terror that permeated most of Romanian society. By 1955, the total number 
of excluded members reached 400,000.
3
 The Romanian Workers‟ Party (RWP) held its 
first congress on 21-23 February 1948, and Gheorghiu-Dej was elected Secretary General 
and party leader; Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Theohari Georgescu were named the 
other three members of the Secretariat. Before 1952, the party did not have a coherent 
decision-making voice, as each leader tried to accumulate as much political capital as 
possible.
4
 The conflicts revolved around the ideological contradictions between “Moscow 
loyalists” (Pauker, Luca, and Georgescu) and “home communists” (Gheorghiu-Dej) 
regarding how to govern the country and bring the Soviet rhetoric to reality.
5
  
As the 1950s began, Gheorghiu-Dej, a “home communist,” yet a loyal enforcer of 
Stalin‟s rule, gained the sole power for himself and his supporters. In 1952, Pauker, Luca 
and Georgescu were purged. Gheorghiu-Dej‟s action against his three rivals coincided 
with the growth of his influence in the party.
6
 Thus, he had taken advantage of the 
increased party discipline brought about by the elimination campaign of the late 1948, as 
well as by territorial reorganization in September 1950, when the counties (judeţ) were 
replaced with a “three-tier” Soviet system of regions, districts (pleşe), and communes. 
This expanded the local bureaucracy, which helped Gheorghiu-Dej and his group to gain 
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power over the local and parliamentary elections of 13 March 1951.
7
 In 1952, the new 
constitution stated that the Romanian People‟s Republic had come into being because of 
the Soviet Union‟s victory over fascist Germany and the Soviet army‟s liberation of 
Romania.
8
 Dej exploited the Soviet link to legitimate his own political position. On 2 
June 1952, he was appointed as President of the Council of Ministers, while continuing to 
serve as Secretary General of the party.
9
 Now the preeminent figure of the party, 
Gheorghiu-Dej ruled the country until his death in 1965. 
 
2. The Garden City:  
The “Garden City” architectural model, which was to prove important in Romania, has a 
long history. Originally formulated in 1898 by Ebenezer Howard‟s essay “Tomorrow: A 
Peaceful Path to the Real Reform,” the concept proposed an urban design that stressed 
quality houses at affordable prices. The “Garden City” anticipated a circular city of 
30,000 inhabitants built on 1,000 acres. Economically based on the idea of changing the 
value of land by increasing the number of migrants, a “Garden City” project would 
consist of individual dwellings and plots of land grouped concentrically around an 
industrial objective. The ideal of the “Garden City” was collective integration and social 
harmony among workers; the concept was presented as a counterpoint to the 
individualistic, multicultural character of the metropolis. Howard maintained that by 
providing a home to well-fed, well-dressed, and well-educated workers, the “Garden 
City” would give rise to a qualitatively different experience, one that fostered stronger 
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community and a better work ethic.
10
 Furthermore, Howard‟s concept implied that the 
development of a specific urban space should greatly depend on the existence of a 
decision-making factor whose power consisted of “holding land, planning the city, timing 
the order of buildings, and providing the necessary social services.”11 
Over the following decades, radicalized by the Bauhaus school of design, the 
“Garden City” principle provided the basis for building programs in many interwar social 
programs all over Europe.
12
 In Germany, to an extent greater than in other European 
countries, architects served municipal authorities by building important housing projects. 
By the end of the 1920s, preeminent architects of the moment such as Ernest May, Bruno 
Taut, or Walter Gropius designed and built countless “Siedlungen” (identical successive 
housing).
13
 The houses aimed to create uniform residential estates, with equal exposure to 
sun and light, functional space distribution, and modern facades in order to define the 
minimum lodging for a regular family. This model was disseminated throughout 
Europe.
14
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3. Romanian Architecture before the Establishment of the Communist Regime: 
During the 1920s and 1930s in Romania, public architecture fluctuated stylistically 
between divergent ideological tendencies: modernism versus traditionalism, and 
centralism versus regionalism. Attempts undertaken by some architects to support the 
centralizing tendencies of the Romanian state that was in the process of integrating the 
new provinces of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania into the country‟s 
administrative structure opened up discussions about architecture‟s function within the 
Romanian national state.
15
 Architecturally, the question had proven extremely difficult 
since, in these provinces, monuments constructed by the ethnic Romanians were sparse. 
Architects synthesized a style named Neo-Romanian, which featured monumental 
building, initially religious, and later administrative, on which Byzantine elements had 
been superimposed. This style gave buildings a sense of nationhood and unity. Another 
style emerged in 1935, when, to modernize an almost medieval city, the most famous 
architects of the time, led by Duliu Marcu, drew up a new urban plan for Bucharest. The 
result, which derived from a local classicism, was meant to embody the political visions 
of the monarch‟s regime, and was even named the “King Carol II” in his honour. Marcu 
and his colleagues proposed for Bucharest a program of street reorganization, the 
building of monumental edifices for state institutions, and the creation of large squares 
for mass parades and public interactions.
16
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 In Romania during the 1920s and 1930s, modernist architecture‟s principles were 
extensively debated. Influenced by Le Corbusier and the Bauhaus school, Radu Udroiu, 
the future head of the Architecture Division under Gheorghiu-Dej, argued that modern 
architecture was “a total art form that coordinated many disciplines.”17 The magazine that 
acted as the key forum for the debates led by Udroiu and Floarea Stănculescu was 
Căminul, which in its brief existence (1928-1929) dealt with questions of house-building 
technologies. Modernism‟s theoreticians advanced an urban formula that would combine 
the comfort of small cities with the economic might of the great metropolis, just as the 
“Garden City” architectural model had previously proposed. By the end of the 1920s, and 
during the 1930s in Bucharest, Vatra Luminoasă, and Resiţa, architects like Horea 
Creangă, Marcel Janco and Radu Udroiu were designing and constructing residential 
establishments for workers.
18
 During the 1930s, theoretical debates revolved around the 
breakthrough of vernacular architectural models and drew upon the sociological and 
folkloric research conducted by Dimitrie Gusti at the Institute for Social Research.
19
 
Traditional forms in modern architecture coincided with a European trend that explored 
essential structures and functional building types and provided designers with new and 
innovative resources and construction solutions. The 1930s construction ideology favored 
an easily accessible and affordable house pattern that synthesized the modernist 
                                                 
17
 Radu Udroiu, Marcel Janco and Nicolae Nedelescu actively militated in the favor of modernist 
architecture and related it to social, economical, and cultural Romanian trends. All three published 
extensively on Le Corbusier‟s theories and used their writings to urge Romanian society to accept and 
endorse the modernist movement. Radu Udroiu, “Le Corbusier-Vers une Architecture,” Căminul 1 (1928): 
27-8, cited in Luminiţa Machedon, Romanian Modernism (Cambrige: MIT Press, 1999), 63; see also 
Popescu, Le style national roumain. 325-40.   
18
 See Duliu Marcu, Arhitectura (Bucharest: Ed. Tehnica, 1960), 231-37; Ana Maria Zaharide, “Locuinta in 
creatia lui Horia Creangă,” in Horia Creangă, Catalogul expoziţiei organizate la 100 de ani de la nastere 
(Bucarest: Editura Uniunii Arhitectilor din Romania, 1992), 118-121. 
19
 Radu Patrulius, Viaţa si opera lui Horea Creangă (Bucharest: Ed. Tehnica, 1992), 49; Machedon, 
Romanian Modernism, 254. 
 24 
principles of the “Garden City” on the one hand and, on the other, the vernacular 
tradition.
20
  
Following the modernists of the 1920s and 1930s, a group of more radical 
modernist artists appeared in the beginning of the 1940s. This group, isolated from the 
rest of the continent during the war, became very active at the end of the conflict and 
restored its connections with the European artistic circles.
21
 The artistic dialogue between 
postwar Romanian and European artistic media influenced not only design production, 
but also artistic education. As such, at the school of architecture in Bucharest beneficed 
from the involvement in the teaching activities of some of the well-known figures of 
Romanian modernism. The architectural education spanned over six years of university 
training, and strongly influences by the French Beaux Arts, consisted of both arts and 
polytechnic ideas, with emphasis on modernist design influenced by the French line of 
thinking. Well-known figures like Richard Bordenache, GM Cantacuzino, Octav 
Doicescu, Adrian Gheorghiu, Grigore Ionescu were involved in teaching. Their presence 
gave the learning system a particular feature, which encouraged students and young 
architects to regard reconstruction issues and political debates of the mid 1940s as 
genuinely stimulating for architectural experiments and daring urban solutions.
22
 
                                                 
20
 Stephen Calloway, ed., The Elements of Style: A Practical Encyclopedia of Interior Architectural 
Details, from 1485 to the Present (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); Vicky Richardson, New 
Vernacular Architecture (New York: Watson-Guptill Publications, 2001).  
21
 See, Stelian Tanase, ed., Avantgarda romaneasca in arhivele Sigurantei (Bucharest: Polirom, 2008); 
Magda Carneci, Artele plastice; S.A. Mansbach, Modern Art in Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Timothy O. Benson and Éva Forgács ed, Between Worlds: A Sourcebook of 
Central European Avant-Gardes, 1910-1930 (Los Angeles and Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).  
22
 See Ion Mircea Enescu, Arhitect sub comunism (Bucharest: Paideia, 2007); Eugenia Greceanu, 
“Sovietizarea învatamantului în arhitectură,” in Arhitecţi în timpul dictaturii. Amintiri, ed. Viorica Curea 
(Bucharest: Simetria, 2005), 123-4.  
 25 
However, by the end of the decade, due to the general political confusion, they had all 
conformed to socialist-realist principles imported by the Soviets.
23
 
 
4. Socialist Realism in Architecture: 
In 1931, the Soviet authorities launched an international competition to build a vast 
“Palace of Soviets” in Moscow. The palace was never built, but four rounds of 
competition determined the form it was to have taken. The first, which opened in 1931, 
set the stylistic guidelines. The second round attracted 160 entries, including twenty from 
abroad. At this point, the Council of the Construction of the Place of Soviets stressed that 
“monumental quality, simplicity, integrity, and elegance in the architectural presentation” 
- now defined as fundamental features of socialist realism - could be achieved by “the 
application both of new methods and the best employed in classical architecture.”24 Two 
contests followed immediately afterward, and by the middle of 1933, a team consisting of 
Boris Iofan, Vladimir Shchukoand and Vladimir Gelfeikh won the contest.
25
 Intended to 
replace the Church of Christ the Redeemer (a nineteenth-century cathedral designed by 
Konstantin Ton and demolished by the Stalinist regime in 1931), the Palace was to have 
almost utopian dimensions. The seating capacity varied between 6,000 and 21,000. The 
building‟s impressive facades were adorned with columns, friezes, and arches. Meant to 
be visible from any part of Moscow, the palace was to be tall, bold, symmetrical, and 
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permanent. Its architectural style had to synthesize classical architecture with elements of 
the historic heritage, and to master present-day construction techniques and materials. 
The Palace of Soviets would be an emblem for the proletariat, showing that workers were 
capable of building fine monuments and had come to power forever.
26
 Accordingly, “in 
its search for an appropriate style, Soviet architecture must strive for realistic criteria, for 
clarity and precision in its images, which must be easily comprehensible by and 
accessible to the masses.”27 
The “Palace of Soviets” was never completed, but the artistic interactions 
generated by this venture illustrated the major steps in the establishment of the socialist-
realist style in architecture and opened up the debates that cast socialist realism as 
necessarily “national in form and socialist in content.” As Hudson has pointed out, the 
regime felt that architecture had to be intelligible to the uneducated masses who were 
going to move into the city after the industrial boom produced by the supposed 
industrialization of the beginning of the 1930s. The most accessible style was seen to be 
the Neoclassical, “which derived its effect in large part from its association with tsarist 
classicism and the architecture of state awe.”28 Socialist-realist architecture joined the 
classical heritage with the use of modern technology. Initially, the Soviets understood 
“classical” to mean Greek, Roman, and Renaissance styles because of the supposedly 
democratic nature of these regimes. Accordingly, “an artwork was party-minded insofar 
as it contributed to the construction of communism, or, insofar as it commented on the 
burning problems which confronted the socialist society.”29  
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In addition, the architectural profession had been institutionalized. In 1933, the 
Moscow Architectural Institute was founded, and the USSR Academy of Architecture 
was created in 1934. Anyone wishing to practice the profession was required to belong to 
the Union of Soviet Architects (along to the Union of Soviet Workers, the Union of 
Soviet Composers, etc.). In June 1937, Russian modernism was officially dismissed at the 
First All-Union Congress of Architecture. Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin‟s watchdog over the 
arts, gained virtually unchecked power over Soviet culture until his death in 1948.
30
  
As far as urban planning was concerned, once disputes between various 
architectural strategies ended, a new rhetoric had emerged, fully in line with the doctrine 
of socialist realism.
31
 Accordingly, as Arkady Grigorievich Mordvinov explained in 
December 1935 in a speech delivered at the Sixth Session of the Academy of 
Architecture, the historical purpose of the Soviet city was to provide an economically 
efficient settlement for community life, whose structures would express the people‟s 
national consciousness. A socialist city had to be distinct from a “Garden City,” and had 
to comprise collective dwellings and state-owned, multistory buildings.
32
 This new 
conception of the city introduced the so-called “quartal”: representing the urban space 
delineated by the intersection of four streets, the quartal became the main urban structure 
within the perimeter of the city. Buildings constructed around that perimeter had to trace 
an enclosed space using similarly constructed buildings, organized in an ensemble of 
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stylistically sober and simple edifices. The interior of these quartals was devoted to green 
spaces and public zones.  
The socialist-realist city would allow the universal access to education and culture 
through the multitude of libraries, cultural centers, and schools, and assert the equality of 
living standards. The city would be planned around the center, which would dominate the 
city‟s architectural unique identity, “determined by squares, main streets, and dominant 
buildings.”33 To synthesize these planning and design principles, Vladimir Semenov and 
Sergei Chernyshev drew up the Moscow plan, accepted in 1935, and later recalled as the 
quintessential illustration of the socialist-realist planning pattern.
34
 By the end of World 
War II, because of the victory over Nazi Germany, then because of international 
confrontation during the Cold War, impressive triumphalist buildings were constructed to 
express Soviet technological and economic superiority first in Moscow, then throughout 
the USSR.  
 
5. Exporting the Principle to Eastern Europe: 
During the process of exporting socialist realism to Eastern Europe, Soviet ideologues 
followed similar step with each country.
35
 Between 1945 and 1948, modernist 
manifestations were allowed to coexist with socialist-realist discourse, timidly employed 
by marginal communist organizations, such as the Friendship Associations with the 
Soviet Union, which organized local actions like the “Month of Friendship with the 
USSR,” or the “Soviet Week.” However, as early as 1947, in a speech delivered at the 
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first session of the newly reopened Academy of Arts, the president Aleksandr Gerasimov 
stressed the task of promoting socialist realism in Eastern Europe at the expense of avant-
gardism. According to Antoine Baudin, “even if the Soviet exhibits presented up to that 
moment in Eastern Europe had been „a great success‟ they were nevertheless threatened 
by an activation of formalist currents and even an unbridled reactionary campaign against 
Soviet art in the press which justified energetic decontamination measures.”36 
Once the communist parties reached absolute power by the end of the 1940s, 
declarations that the socialist-realist method was the only correct one grew more 
vehement. The Soviets increased the numbers of itinerary exhibitions displayed in the so-
called “popular democracies.”37 The USSR also organized field trips that allowed 
architects from the Eastern European countries to visit Soviet cities. These trips had 
multiple purposes. First, the USSR wished to tutor Eastern Europeans about the supposed 
superiority of Soviet civilization, reborn from the ruins of World War II, powerful and 
almighty. In addition, these trips were meant to indoctrinate East European architects and 
convince them on theoretical and methodological grounds to abandon modernist 
approaches in favor of Soviet forms of classicism, under an institutionalized structure of 
architectural production. Those privileged enough to have benefitted from these visits 
were highly placed within the party structure; in time, such visits increased in number and 
frequency.
38
 From 1949 on, institutionalization within the artistic realm, the centralization 
of media information, the introduction of censure, and the reevaluation of academic 
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curricula were seen as necessary steps to increase the popular democracies‟ ties to the 
Soviet Union.
39
 After 1950, legislative and political measures definitively set the lines in 
cultural production that were followed thoroughly until Stalin‟s death in 1953, after 
which socialist-realist constrains were somewhat loosened.
40
  
 
6. Stalinism’s Impact upon Romanian Architecture:   
Parallel with the Romanian Communist Party‟s process of political solidification, the 
cultural sphere was shaped by Soviet influences as well. Already, by the end of 1944 two 
bodies dominated the Romanian cultural landscape: the Minister of Propaganda led by art 
historian Petre Constantinescu-Iaşi, a university professor and during the 1930s, president 
of the Romanian Soviet Society, and the “Friendship Association for the Strengthening of 
the Romanian Soviet Relations” (ARLUS), also headed by Constantinescu-Iaşi. In 1948, 
the Minister of Propaganda was transformed into the Minister of Arts and Information. 
Constantinescu-Iaşi remained in charge of it and with the aid of Mihail Roller, the local 
Zhdanov in the field of history, supervised the nation‟s cultural activities.41 
Established by the end of 1944, soon after the surfacing on the political scene of 
the Romanian Communist Party, ARLUS was directly subordinated to its Soviet model, 
VOKS, which propagated Soviet cultural values abroad. In 1944, at the headquarters of 
ARLUS, notorious Soviet officials, including the head of VOKS, Vladimir Kemenov, the 
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Soviet advisor Andrei Vishinski (Stalin‟s mouthpiece during the show trials of the 
1930s), and numerous Soviet delegates introduced socialist-realist rhetoric to Romanian 
officials. ARLUS made use of the existing infrastructure – mass media, the museum 
network, and local bureaucracy – to interpret, adapt, and apply the Soviet system. 
Facilitating Soviet-Romanian cultural collaboration, the association provided information 
on industrial, agricultural, and scientific Soviet achievements, and thereby played a key 
role in introducing theoretical methods for the development of the Romanian economy.
42
 
ARLUS brought together representatives of all fields of cultural creation. The 
organizational structure, more sophisticated than an academy or even a university, 
comprised twelve separate departments: economy, science, literature and philosophy, 
applied science, social science, army, communications and transport, education, press, 
propaganda, art, and sport-tourism. Each section had one president, one vice-president, 
several secretaries, and one librarian.
43
 Although theoretically, the complex web of mass 
communication techniques functioned faultlessly, practically, the system faced the burden 
of bureaucratic inconsistencies and administrative chaos, and before 1948, its influence 
was strictly limited to its members.
44
 In terms of its influence on architecture before the 
late 1940s, discrepancies between Soviet architectural literature accessible to the public 
through ARLUS libraries, and French language writings published between 1945 and 
1947 available in Bucharest bookstores convey the idea that within the profession there 
were two parallel drives. Furthermore, before 1948, Romanian architects actively 
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participated at international congresses of architecture and urban planning in France, 
Great Britain, Switzerland, and Germany.
45
 
The institutionalization of socialist realism in Romania combined ambitious 
initiatives with institutional delays. In 1949, for instance, Romania was one of the first 
Eastern bloc countries to mount an artistic exhibition honoring Stalin‟s seventieth 
birthday; it also renamed Brasov “The Stalin City.”46 At the end of 1947, the Romanian 
Architects Association merged into AGIR (Association of Romanian Engineers), which 
in 1949 was transformed into AST (Association of Scientific Technicians). Between 1949 
and 1952, within the Ministry of Construction there were established the National Burro 
of Systematization and the Centre for Regional Planning; within the Romanian Academy 
of Science, the Centre for Research in Architecture and Demography and the Department 
for Research in Folklore were responsible for research activity.  
On 13 November 1952, the Romanian Communist Party‟s Central Committee 
agreed upon three resolutions, which marked the complete institutionalization of socialist 
realism in architecture. The first concerned the construction and reconstruction of the 
Romanian urban territory and the ideological training of architects, the second a new plan 
for Bucharest and the third an underground metro system for the same city, all of which 
illustrated the ongoing centralist-institutional tendencies manifested by the communist 
state. The Romanian Counsel of Ministers‟ State Committee for Architecture and 
Construction became an extraordinary decision-making organism over national building 
issues, and expanded its authority over all planning structures no mater their previous 
institutional affiliation. Its monthly bulletin published government‟s legislation on 
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building program. Accordingly, there were established Regional and Local 
Systematization offices, led by chief-architects appointed individually by the Prime 
Minister Gheorghiu-Dej. The Institute for Urban Planning and Constructions (ISPROR) 
was created to serve the State Committee‟s building priorities.47 On 21 December 1952, 
the Architects‟ Union was established, and its president, Duliu Marcu, saluted the “bright 
perspectives that the party‟s decisions had opened for the Romanian people.”48 
In addition, at the beginning of the 1950s, the first number of Arhitectura 
(“Architecture”) was published. This periodical soon gained ascendancy over all 
alternative professional publications and became a propaganda tool. An article published 
in 1952 integrated architecture and buildings in the ideological context of the moment 
and further related construction programs to a number of key political concepts imported 
from the Soviet Union‟s vocabulary: “class interest,” “five-year plans,” “the working 
class,” “native land,” the “struggle against bourgeois ideology,” “decadent culture of the 
West,” “imperialism,” “peaceful reconstruction,” and “national tradition.”49 Romanian 
architecture, the article argued, had to be “national in form and socialist in content.” This 
dictum interfered with the efforts to make the construction of urban experience an 
aesthetic exercise, instead forcing architects to employ vernacular images as a way of 
defining modernity as progress and technology for the sake of socialist transformation.
50
  
Stylistically, the shift from “unduly modernist landscape” to “serene socialist 
realism” occurred in Romania between 1949 and 1954, causing not just a visual 
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conversion, but as well a redeployment of the social function of the architecture. 
Comprised in the rhetoric‟s main tenet “national in form and socialist in content” it was 
synonym with the allocation of formative function within a social system. Therefore, 
architecture came to play a more central place within the society whereas the space had 
been allocated the main function of mediating between the political authority and the 
masses. The continuous dialogue between Moscow and Bucharest set the bases for the 
new architecture. Already by the mid-to-late 19940s, influenced by the architecture 
practiced extensively in Romania prior to World War II, architects traveled to Moscow 
with the modernist designs for the future Casa Scânteii. There, two members of the 
Soviet Academy, K. Simonov and Mordvinov, the same member of the Soviet Academy 
of Architecture who had theorized the correct aspect of the socialist-realist city during the 
1930s, advised them on how to adapt local Romanian realities to socialist-realist rhetoric. 
In 1949, after rejecting several of the Romanians‟ projects on the grounds of 
“formalism,” the Russians proposed instead an architecture that was “national in form 
and socialist in content.” The Romanian architects brought with them from Moscow new 
plans for the Casa Scânteii that now called for it to be built as a smaller version of the 
recently constructed Moscow State University building in Lenin Hills.
51
 This episode, 
mentioned by Horia Maicu in an article published in 1952 in Arhitectură şi Urbanism, 
was regarded as the benchmark in converting the Romanian architecture to “national in 
form and socialist in content” rhetoric. Indeed, according to Maicu‟s statement, the style 
of the Casa Scânteii synthesized the entire Romanian architectural repertoire, and the 
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Soviet‟s advice on how to employ the local heritage proved consistent in eliminating 
modernist manifestations.
52
  
 
   
Figure 2.1 Lomonosov Moscow State University         Figure 2.2 “Casa Scânteii,” Bucharest (1951-1954). 
(1949-1953). Architects Lev Rudnev et al.     Architects Horia Maicu et al.   
 
 
In 1953, another Romanian delegation, led by Horia Maicu, the chief-architect of 
the Casa Scânteii, paid a visit to the Soviet Union. While Moscow, the principal example 
of the USSR‟s enormous technological and artistic power, was usually the first stop in 
during these pilgrimages, the architects‟ instruction in this case included journeys to war-
torn cities such as Kiev, Stalingrad, and Leningrad. Romanian architects headed to other 
Soviet cities, such as Yerevan and Tbilisi.
53
 There, they were introduced to building 
projects that the Soviet part forward as models for the Romanians to imitate. According 
to Horia Maicu, the trip offered a full perspective on the triumph of the Soviet rebuilding 
process; the Romanians all agreed that “national in form and socialist in content” best 
summarized the architectural essence of socialist realism. In Yerevan, they learned that 
“under national form, influenced by the old architectonic traditions, was the new content 
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of the Soviet capital of Armenia.”54 Equally important, by viewing Armenian buildings, 
they understood that the tie with the national form was “subordinated through discreet 
ornaments and details.”55 They discussed how the traditional and the national had to be 
reproduced clearly, a step which would supposedly link the consciousness of the past to 
that of the present. Tbilisi showed them that, the people of Georgia had started looking to 
the past before the other peoples of the Soviet Union had.
56
  
To sum up, Romania‟s absorption into the Soviet cultural sphere occurred under 
an institutional and ideological exchange of ideas between Bucharest and Moscow; it also 
involved the reevaluation of the artistic hierarchies within the communist state. Viewing 
cultural production from this perspective opens up the question of how these actions, 
produced by major international events, were manifested in various individual cases and 
to what extent the materialization of socialist realism was conditioned by local conditions 
specific to each country or region.  
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III 
The First Phase in the Construction of the City (1947-1949) 
In the mid-to-late 1940s, Andrei Zhdanov, Central Committee Secretary, Politburo 
member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Stalin‟s spokesperson 
in the cultural field, identified two antagonistic cultural spheres: the West and the Soviet 
Union.
1
 He argued that the West‟s artistic idioms were inappropriate for a socialist 
society, and that socialist realism was the most modern art of the moment, yet realistic 
enough to conform to the popular artistic demands of the masses.
2
 The cultural campaign 
that followed these statements, known as the Zhdanovshchina after its initiator, was not 
hard to understand: by the end of World War II, the former allies were trying to restore 
social order and reconstruct war-devastated infrastructures. The rebuilding process 
mirrored the tense ideological state of affairs that took over the international scene once 
the Cold War set in and, as Soviets argued, the International Congress of Architecture 
held in Lausanne in September 1948 marked the definitive aesthetic fracture between the 
two worlds.
3
 Echoing political developments, “the ideological and aesthetic polarization 
between the West and the USSR produced an artistic antagonism that was certainly more 
visible than in other disciplines.”4 In the Soviet Union, an inflexible bureaucratic cultural 
network of societies, academies, and institutions took control over cultural production 
and made sure that aesthetics respected the Party‟s line. In the Eastern bloc, the so-called 
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“Friendship Associations with the Soviet Union” carried out the difficult task of 
accommodating the local institutional structures quickly and efficiently to the new 
political reality. Already by the end of 1947, ARLUS (Romanian Friendship Association 
for Strengthening the Relations with the Soviet Union) voiced by M. Magheru, its 
General Secretary, subscribed to the “two champs theory” and acknowledged the Soviet 
merit into the Romanian reconstruction program.
5
 In Romania, as everywhere else in the 
Eastern bloc, however, the influential modernist Western practices that had previously 
shaped the local traditions challenged the Soviet ideology‟s capacity to counterbalance 
the heterogeneous cultures inside the Eastern bloc, and also the content of the socialist-
realist slogan “national in form and socialist in content.”  
Viewing the Hunedoara building project within this frame immediately opens up 
two lines of inquiry: the built environment‟s ideology and the state‟s logistical capacity to 
convey for the masses the urban space‟s intended meaning. Culturally and politically, 
ARLUS tailored its rhetoric to Soviet ideological regulations. Architecturally, the 
Hunedoara case illustrates the interaction between designers and politicians on one hand, 
and local traditions and Soviet rhetoric on the other, and questions the significance that 
architectural discourse had within the socialist state system, given that the communist 
state employed socialist-realist narratives to advertise Western building patterns. By 
addressing both archival and newspaper information, I will argue that during the late 
1940s, the well-established international rhetoric that opposed the West and the East was 
familiar to political circles alone and mostly unable to influence cultural organs not under 
the communists‟ direct control.   
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1. Political Decision-making:  
While on 6 March 1945 the Soviets managed to impose their will in Romania by setting a 
Soviet sympathetic government led by Petru Groza, transforming the local communist 
organization into a new political elite – and an efficient instrument in Moscow hands – 
was a crucial task.
6
 In October 1945, at the party‟s first national meeting, newly-elected 
Secretary General Gheorghiu-Dej delivered a theoretically compelling speech that fit the 
project of social modernization into the Soviet ideological strategy; it addressed a vide 
variety of issues, such as the development of a planned economy, heavy industrialization, 
electrification, and the collectivization of agriculture. This ambitious project was to be 
realized on two levels: the modernization of the state and the modernization of the 
individuals.
7
  
Whereas modernity was the expression of technological development, the 
transformation of the Romanian state would be achieved through the manipulation of 
consumption ideology with the development of heavy industry providing financial 
stability. Gheorghiu-Dej argued that “according to the specialists‟ estimations, the plants 
of Hunedoara would supply the national steel production for at least another thirty 
years.”8 Dej imagined a highly centralized system dominated economically and culturally 
by the steel industry, and in which society would be held together by commonly accepted 
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values derived not from below, but from above. State institutions would produce and 
disseminate from those institutions an industrial ideology. The steel plants in Hunedoara, 
the largest in the country by the end of World War II, were the major provider of heavy 
industrial goods, not just for internal consumption, but with careful management export 
as well.
9
 However, Gheorghiu-Dej‟s discourse overemphasized the importance of the site. 
He thought investments into this plant would be capable of stimulating the nation‟s entire 
economy, thereby increasing the levels of consumption, and improving the ordinary 
workers‟ standards of living. Furthermore, this economic strategy would provide the 
country with stability and economic power, as well as financial independence through the 
increase of commercial exports. The building of a socialist political system would follow 
from this, and in turn would be succeeded by a system management phase. Its principal 
task would be to integrate the regime with other non-party sectors of society, such as 
urban development, housing, consumption, and commodity production.
10
  
The modernization of the individual would derive from the modernization of the 
state. Generically known as the “new man” concept, this was a root idea of communism 
and synthesized a vide range of qualities, which were assigned by socialist-realist art and 
literature to the so-called “positive hero.” The new citizen had to be active, energetic and 
culturally competent, versatile, physically fit and able to subjugate nature. In a classless 
society, the “new man” embodied superior qualities that would make the communist 
society distinctive. The immediate consequence of the emergence of the “new man” 
would be efficiency in work, cultural and technological progress, and social dynamism. 
Therefore, addressing the built environment as the constitutive factor in the process of 
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defining the new individual entailed an ultimate connection between the environment‟s 
ideological significance and the individuals‟ reading of the political decision.11 In this 
respect, the built environment‟s major function consisted of creating “new images to 
embody and transmit messages and myths to audiences who were themselves always 
moving forward as their political consciousness and aesthetic sensibilities developed.”12 
Dej declared that “The continuous performance of Soviet industrial principles will 
produce the increase in housing and city standards thanks to the existence of a complex 
industrial Soviet-like enterprise.”13 Although Dej did not explicitly stress this point, the 
1945 political program implied that, because of the development of a Soviet-like 
industrial center in Hunedoara, the city constructed there would respect the ongoing 
Soviet architectural patterns of residence. Within the future socialist society, “material 
culture was part of the social holism, which had a significant impact upon the silhouette 
of those objects that shaped economic and political relations as well as individual social 
consciousness.”14 Hence, during this period of intensifying political conflict and radical 
transformation, architecture encompassed the significance of decisions at the very core of 
the building process. The discourse used the concept of modernization as a mode of 
social integration based on patterns of cultural practices organized around economic 
principles, which would further “get the city right, and produce the right citizens.”15  
This discourse used excessively ideological terminology that would later turn into 
omnipresent linguistic stereotypes, and provided the communists with a major 
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opportunity to establish their leadership.
16
 Dej‟s statement, made before the party 
members in 1945, revealed emerging patterns of authority and had multiple purposes. 
Internally, it formulated a ruling program for a political structure that had recently 
surfaced on the Romanian public scene, financially feeble and socially fragile. Externally, 
it legitimized the organization in front of its fellow communist parties.  
 
2. The Garden City Program:  
In 1947, committed to the 1945 Party‟s political program, the state began investing in the 
Steel Plants of Hunedoara. At the end of 1947, the communists took absolute power in 
Romania. A decree issued on 18 July 1948 established a state Planning Commission that 
would exert full control over the development of all branches of the Romanian national 
economy.
17
 Its chairperson was Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who was also the Minister of 
National Economy and General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party.
18
 Between 
1947 and 1948, under the leadership of Gustav Gusti, the Institute of Planning and 
Constructions (IPC) drew up a plan named “A Labor City at Hunedoara,” which followed 
the “Garden City” architectural model. The building program in the city should be 
viewed from two distinctive perspectives: political and architectural.  
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First, politically, the project was an attempt to provide the masses with a sample 
of the political program that materialized after October 1945, when ambitious objectives 
set the Communist Party‟s agenda. Meanwhile, already by the mid 1947 the Communist 
Party progressed from a marginal political organization into the central decision-making 
factor within the Romanian society. Accordingly, the Hunedoara project had to be 
completed through a national development stratagem that required lucid strategies and 
significant financial resources. As in many other socialist systems, much of the time, the 
efforts of communist officials focused on raising productivity, and successive state 
strategies required accommodations and concessions, but generated additional pressure 
and repression, as well.
19
 For instance, an article published in 1947 stated that, “the party 
had demanded us to utilize the metallurgic industrial potential, namely the functioning of 
the four furnaces, in the Hunedoara plant.”20 However, because the party required, 
something does not necessarily mean that it also provided financial resources to complete 
the task: the forth furnace, for instance, was not inaugurated until 24 March 1950.
21
 Local 
circumstances thus established a new balance of power in which both workers and 
institutions‟ directors influenced the system as their personal interests required; often the 
central projects failed because of financial incoherencies.
22
 There are reasons to suspect 
that this pecuniary inconsistency affected the building sector as well. 
Second, architecturally, the Hunedoara project contracted certain Western 
elements and therefore called into question newly-formulated Soviet ideas about the city, 
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architecture, and the built environment. The Communist Party employed the 
aforementioned Soviet architectural discourse and based its assumptions on ideological 
and political certainties. Theoretically infallible, the party‟s program asked local 
Romanian architects for building solutions and appropriate urban models. The architects, 
however, implemented the modernizing project according to their own understanding and 
adopted conventions of space, size, and alignment that expressed modernist aims to 
reorganize labor and industrial production; their program mainly stressed professional 
values over explicitly ideological ones.  
Broadly speaking, before 1947, Romanian architects received little opportunity to 
implement their visions about urban reconstruction. Mostly due to financial problems, in 
the years prior to the First Congress of the Romanian Architects held in October 1948, 
architects were eagerly engaged in genuinely professional debates regarding 
reconstruction solutions in the context of European trends, and less involved in 
planning.
23
 In 1947, for instance, G.M. Cantacuzino, spokesperson and mentor for 
generations of Romanian architects, proposed building solutions in line with “Garden 
City” patterns; he was keenly aware that the country could not exist in isolation from the 
world and fully embraced ongoing European architectural trends in the hope of 
establishing a universal system of values.
24
 In his book For an Aesthetic of 
Reconstruction (“Pentru o estetică a reconstrucţiei”), Cantacuzino called for the 
integration of peripheral communities into the national consciousness.
25
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Furthermore, in March 1947, M. Silianu stressed that up until that day, decision-
making factors drew neither a national urban plan nor a facile legislative package to 
support the reconstruction program, and the absence of a set of specific socio-economical 
priorities assumed politically made it difficult for architects to build major urban 
programs.
26
 In terms of urban options, Silianu rightly observed that Romanian 
architecture of the moment synthesized three aesthetic directions: a modernist style 
interested in functionalist solutions, a stylized classicism, and a vernacular architecture 
concerned with regional geometries. By continuing that synthesis, he argued, the 
architects would actually create a genuinely national Romanian stile, which would solve 
an aesthetic concern in need of consideration for quite some time.
27
 In terms of feasible 
urban solutions, Silianu‟s thesis revolved around the 1930s CIAM ideas and prioritized 
the space within a city in line with the four principles of the Chart of Athens: separations 
of functions, circulation, recreation, and work.
28
 One year later, Stefan Bălan restated the 
fundamental values of CIAM Chart in the process of urban development.
29
  
Within this theoretical frame between 1946 and 1948, the Romanian Architects 
Association organized grope discussions and seminars, which had to convey the 
principles of collective dwelling systems into feasible building solutions and provide 
architects with answers on planning‟s methodology, space functions, social dynamics and 
                                                 
26
 The year 1947 was the last moment in the process of communist takeover. All the hostile elements were 
eliminated from the Romanian political life, the press and any other means of communication was put 
under the communists‟ strict control. However, until 30 December 1947 Romania was a monarchy. At the 
end of 1947, there was established an Urbanism Committee under the Ministry of Industry.  
27
 M. Silianu, “Cadrul actual al problemelor de urbanism şi arhitectură,” in Revistele Tehnice AGIR-
Arhitectură şi Construcţii 1 (March 1947): 10-3. 
28
 Ibid., 12; see also G. M. Cantacuzino, Pentru o estetică a reconstrucţiei.  
29
 Stefan Bălan, “Consideraţiuni asupra urbanismului contemporan,” in Revistele Tehnice AGIR-Arhitectură 
şi Construcţii 1 (January-February 1948): 17-21. 
 46 
construction materials.
30
 Led by Gustav Gusti, these seminars were concerned 
particularly with finding planning solutions for large-scale dwelling assembles; as Gusti 
himself acknowledged in an address published in 1948, the recently completed 
Hunedoara project was the very outcome of these seminars.
31
 Furthermore, the program 
in Hunedoara benefitted from the 1946 “Concepţii moderne în contrucţia locuinţelor” 
(“Modern concepts in building‟s development”), and the experience in Ferentari dwelling 
project in Bucharest.
32
  
In this respect, Gusti‟s contribution consisted of employing research data and 
planning methodology from the Study grope to a major building enterprise on one hand, 
and on the other, proposing a compelling theoretical framework on the post-war modern 
living and comfort standards as applied to a national urban setting. A singular approach 
within the post-war Romanian architecture, Gusti‟s theoretical program targeted two 
distinctive issues: the internal structure of the dwelling and the urban space‟s distribution.  
In terms of planning‟s setting, the architects considered the CIAM separation of 
functions principles as concrete physical differences within the urban space. As such, the 
city was planned to be constructed at about forty-five minutes by foot from the perimeter 
of the historic city and industrial site.
33
 This reconfiguration reflected a clear position of 
the architects to separate functions within the city. Furthermore, they argued that “the 
squares – pietas, more or less monumental, excessively long sidewalks, and broadly 
speaking large spaces covered with pavement to the detriment of green areas - would 
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illustrate a bad use of the urban space.”34 The dwelling space synthesized daring 
modernist experiments and innovations in construction methodology; some of the key 
concepts used in these documents were “density,” “wide and sunny rooms,” “modern 
amenities,” “centralized heating system” with the distribution of hot air through the 
ceiling, “preponderance of green areas,” “west or south-east room orientation.” Gusti 
supported a rational distribution of both space and functions within the dwelling‟s 
perimeter and recommended several furnishing solutions for each room-type. For the 
1947-1948 projects, the two major functions of the dwelling‟s structure - leisure and 
hygiene - had to be separated in order to provide the most appropriate living environment. 
Because, as Gustav Gusti argued “the coordination of exterior and interior is the essence 
of the whole problem of the new architecture,” the organizing of the interior space had to 
be optimized according to the principle of “circulation.”35 The house plan was 
economical and compact, almost inscribed in a square, proposing a cohabitation of 
functions and amenities in order to improve the functionality of the dwelling space.
36
 
Accordingly, representing the finest solution in room distribution around the dwelling‟s 
main utilities, the pattern would be standardized so that variables like number of rooms, 
number of persons inhabiting that space or number of floors would have no thoroughly 
impact upon the intended dwelling‟s functionality. The furniture would have to set to fit 
the rooms‟ minimal dimensions and in the absence of a well-researched manual of 
interior design, Gusti recommended the “Architect‟s Book.”37  
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Figure 3.1 Gustav Gusti‟s “Circulation Principle.” From Gustav Gusti “Contribuţii la studiul locuinţei 
populare,” Revistele Tehnice AGIR-Arhitectură şi Construcţii 7 (1947): 15. 
 
Architecturally, in Hunedoara, the modernity of the project was expressed by both 
the general urban plan and the houses‟ interior, which were designed according to the 
latest requirements of finishes and technological comfort.
38
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Hunedoara, 1947 Proposed Urban 
Plan, dwelling detail (below) and general (right). 
Architects Gustav Gusti et al. From Gustav Gusti, 
“Contribuţii la studiul locuinţei populare,”  
Revistele Tehnice AGIR-Arhitectură şi Construcţii 
7 (1947): 21 
                                     
 
 
 
 
In the initial project, the architects Gustav Gusti, A. Moisescu, and V.I. Perceac 
planned to build 1,000 apartments, in one-storey-high houses, each with 500 square 
meters of private land.
39
 The new neighborhood had to shelter twenty-five per cent of the 
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Steel Works‟ employees and, additionally, had to support an extensive urban plan, which 
would allow further building in case the industrial establishment‟s development or 
political demands required it. Because of the local conditions and the demand for living 
space, the building began by the end of 1947 and was completed only four weeks later.
40
  
The project began as perimeter block developments (lining the street edge) that 
were gradually transformed into apartment slabs with compact, efficiently planned units. 
In line with the professional planning trends of the 1940s, the dwellings followed an 
urban ordering initially proposed by the “Garden City” movement, with streets drawn 
concentrically around a public space where public buildings would be constructed. In 
Hunedoara, the project adopted a system of north-south streets, orientated in parallel, and 
buildings grouped in pairs. These featured parallel rows of apartment blocks in a park 
setting to provide both the living rooms and the bedrooms and kitchens with sun 
exposure.
41
 Interested particularly in sun orientation, architects followed building patterns 
previously experimented with in Germany during the late 1920s, and designed an urban 
space somewhat monotonous in terms of exterior variation of the facades.
42
 
Economically, those homes would had been cheap, functional, and numerous. 
Sociologically, they would had brought about collective integration, in effect 
transforming architectural discourse by casting designers as agents of social change and 
modernization. To acquire such personal transformation the architects opted for a 
functionalist architecture and paid particular attention to the interior organization of 
space. As proposed by the architects, the design of the Hunedoara houses started from the 
interior space that would reflect new patterns of urban living within modernist planning 
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principles. The architects projected three different types of apartments. Each dwelling 
included one living room, up to three bedrooms, and some outbuildings. The average size 
of a dwelling, with three separate rooms, plus annexes, was of 140 square meters.
43
 
According to the “principle of circulation” on which the future estate housing was to be 
based, the architects standardized the planning components that composed different types 
of buildings. The smallest housing unit – three rooms and a kitchen – featured a large 
living area flanked by bedrooms and side rooms. One or two more rooms could be added 
to obtain larger dwellings; alternatively, a second floor could be added to all or part of the 
original bungalow unit to create two-storey family houses.
44
  
Along with individual houses, a series of blocks of one-room apartments for 
single workers, and some social, cultural, and health-specialized buildings were 
projected. During the 1947 campaign, there were realized, according to this project (later 
known as “solution A”), the first forty-four dwellings, as well as the road binding them to 
the old settlement (which represented the northern border of the new district).
45
 
However, these dwellings did not meet the social needs of the years following 
World War II, when the demand for housing increased constantly. Thus, in 1948, to 
organize space more efficiently, architects changed the initial project, and replaced one-
storey buildings with two-storey buildings.
46
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Figure 3.3 “Garden City” Solution A, 1947. Architects Gustav Gusti et al. (Photo 2008). 
 
 
This second scheme, designed by Gustav Gusti, C. Gusti, and Dumitru Hardt, and 
known as “solution B,” fulfilled more efficiently the project‟s initial requirements to 
accommodate numerous workers quickly.
47
 The task of molding interior space was 
complicated by the need to respond to external urban space. The new perimeter was built 
on lands inappropriate for any urban development. The houses, however, were equal to 
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the new expectations of comfort; they permitted flexible interior spaces, and rose to the 
contemporary standards of amenities.
48
  
 
       
 
Figure 3.4  Hunedoara, 1948 Proposed Urban            Figure 3.5 1960s “Garden City” view (“Solution B”).  
Plan (“Solution B”). Detail and general project.            Architects Gustav Gusti et al.  Courtesy     
Architects Gustav Gusti et al. From Gustav Gusti,       Constantin Gaina. 
“Un oras muncitoresc,” 26. 
 
According to “solution B,” the project proposed a compression of living functions 
so that more people used less space. One solution was to combine the kitchen and the 
living room into one single space measuring less than twenty square meters, half of the 
initial projected surface.
49
 Before the change, the rooms‟ dimensions had been quite 
large; the average size of a dwelling did not exceed eighty square meters. According to 
“solution B,” the two-storey individual buildings were initially designed to host two 
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families in one single apartment.
50
 Some magazines even published furnishing 
solutions.
51
  
 
Figure 3.6  Hunedoara “Solution B.” Dwelling detail. 
Furnishing solutions for a two storey  
single family dwelling with options to host simultaneously 
two families featuring up to eight persons (right).  
From Gustav Gusti, “Un oras,” 27.                              
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Hunedoara “Solution B,” Exterior view 
(below). (Photo 2008).                                                                                         
 
 
                      
                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                              
 
The typology of the project was similar to low-cost projects conducted during the 
1930s in Romania. The modernity of the housing was manifested both at the level of the 
particular architectural object, to which new functional and aesthetic principles were 
applied, and more generally in the urban space‟s exterior, which was given form by the 
presence of the new housing. Between 1947 and 1948, both projects were finalized 
partially; the state built 100 apartments out of 1,000 planned.
52
 As far as public buildings 
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were concerned, or the city‟s socialist silhouette - with high-rise and impressive squares, 
esplanades and streets – these items had not even been included in the initial project.  
 
Figure 3.8 Hunedoara, 1947-1948 Final Urban Plan. From APMH-Igo, 1948, vol. 8589, 17. 
 
 
3. Dwellings for Steel: 
In February 1948 at the Second Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, politicians 
launched a vehement critique against the ways national construction sites were led, 
planning conducted, ideology assimilated, and progress noticed. Officials in charge with 
the written press hurried to assimilate the party‟s point of view and saved no effort to 
publicly showing their familiarity with the new literary critique instrument: “art as 
ideology.”53 In the written media, concepts relating to the socialist-realist agenda became 
ubiquitous, and various institutions, usually under ARLUS or party‟s direct control, 
turned their attention to the arts as a solution to their concern on interacting with the 
masses. 
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In light of this at the beginning of 1948, Flacăra, the weekly review of the 
Association of Artists, Writers, and Journalists, announced that artists would get involved 
into the national reconstruction programs, which were recently identified with the 
Communist Party‟s agenda. By moving onto the construction sites, artists would organize 
locally the cultural activities on one hand, and on the other would use their personal 
experiences as inspiration sources for valuable socialist-realist creations.
54
 The outcome 
of the artists‟ involvement was the so-called “construction-site literature,” a collection of 
propaganda fiction and journalistic investigations focusing on the Romanian building 
programs, which stressed the overall construction effort and placed less spotlight on 
personal stories or workers‟ volunteer engagement. In July 1948, however, an editor at 
Scânteia, the Communist Party‟s daily newspaper, wrote an article that criticized the 
content of Flacăra magazine for fallacious coverage of cultural activities, which echoed 
the construction of the “new man,” and building programs including the Hunedoara one, 
which revealed, he said, “the Romanian state‟s dynamism and great economic 
potential.”55 He argued that, generally, in the transformation of the Romanian communist 
society, architecture was to play the central part in educating the masses and 
communicating socialist ideology to the population. Furthermore, architecture equally 
encompassed economic development, socialist construction, the validity of the concept of 
the new man, and the exceptionality of the new proletarian morale.
56
 This interaction, as 
Catherine Cooke has pointed out “was essential for the aesthetics to become central in the 
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communist system as they shaped the entire process of communication.”57 Yet, Flacăra 
magazine dismissed all these ideological certainties, presented an indistinct viewpoint on 
the country‟s newest building sites, and placed no emphasis whatsoever upon “socialist 
competition,”58 which was considered the only true method of activating new structures 
and values.
59
  
Within a month following Scânteia‟s intervention, Flacăra published several 
responses that admitted the allegations of ideological flaws and subscribed to the Soviet 
ideology‟s main tenet according to which “socialist realism was tantamount to workers‟ 
involvement into the national programs” and use of individual heroes‟ example within 
mass-media would increase the reconstruction program‟s dynamism. Furthermore, artists 
were trained and re-sent to Hunedoara and other industrial sites.
60
 A similar point of view 
was expressed by the exhibition “Architecture and Urbanism in Romanian People‟s 
Republic” planned to be opened to the public in October 1948, and designed in order to 
highlight the reconstruction program as originating in the people‟s engagement and 
volunteer work.
61
  
In light of these ideological interactions of the 1948, the authorities saw 
architecture as the cultural basis for the workers‟ education. It mediated the process of 
converting socialist-realist rhetoric into a cognitive factor of the surrounding world. By 
the end of 1948, for example, in several consecutive issues of Scânteia, the editors 
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published the telling life story of Budoy, one of the most important workers of the steel 
plants from Hunedoara.
62
 He began working in the plant in 1927, after having served his 
country, as a soldier in the army. In 1929, a severe sickness forced him to retire “for an 
entire year.” He was fired because the leadership of the plant (which, incidentally, 
belonged to the state) did not care about the employees‟ private inconveniences. In 1933, 
after strikes that paralyzed the entire economy, Budoy witnessed fearfully how the 
military had been deployed at the entrance of the enterprise. Finally, the end of World 
War II found him engaged in the most thorough reconstruction program, which both the 
plant and the city had ever encountered.
63
 A young co-worker Atanasiu looked up at 
Budoy with reverence. Atanasiu who had left his family in Bucharest to assist with 
Hunedoara‟s construction, represented the potentially heroic younger generation that 
would learn from friends like Budoy. Although offered a return home several times, 
Atanasiu declined the proposal persistently because, he said, “he was needed here!”64 The 
story is a typical socialist-realist one, used by the propagandistic media to relate the 
regime‟s message to the masses.  
By the end of 1940s, the “socialist-realist canon was already so formalized that it 
was possible to construct a unified reality from elements previously created in the Soviet 
Union.” 65 These were transmitted to the Eastern bloc as standardized narratives thought 
to appeal easily to the masses. Such forms of advertised messages, used by the entire 
propagandistic apparatus and not only by the mass media, by this time employed typical 
plots and forms of expression, standardized narratives conveying monolithic meanings. 
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For instance, the hero of most of the propagandistic materials of that time was a Soviet 
representative who, had usually crossed over into a state of consciousness; while, 
Katerina Clark has pointed out, “the phases of his life symbolically recapitulate the stages 
of historical progress as ascribed in Marxist Leninist theory.”66 Budoy was obviously a 
victim of the economic crisis that affected the world economy in the late 1920s.
67
 The 
hard times made him stronger and helped him to develop a socialist consciousness that 
served admirably the communists‟ purposes of instilling strong anti-imperialist attitudes 
amongst the regime‟s subjects. The basis was not an abstract ideological construct, but an 
individual‟s illustrative personal experience. Within the Soviet positive-hero typology of 
the late 1940s, Budoy was the very essence of the model worker who was active in 
society, a social model and a mentor; he had life experience and was loyal to the 
communist regime. This kind of individual - mature, conscious, and wise, as Budoy was - 
greatly differed from the young, spontaneous, energetic Atanasiu. Consequently, inside 
the propagandistic narrative of the post-war pattern of socialist realism, the initiation of 
the positive but spontaneous youth often provided a subplot, rather than a central plot: it 
was the subordinate of the hero who was initiated, not the hero himself.
68
 The central plot 
was a tale of promotion or reward since in the end Atanasiu was given a better home and 
reunited with his family.
69
  Although very simple in content, the Budoy-Atanasiu story 
raises compelling questions regarding historical relevance, ideological value within the 
socialist realist narrative both locally and regionally, and relevance for the built 
environment.  
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In 1933, when troops were deployed at the entrance of the Griviţa factory, railway 
workers started strikes and numerous social movements protesting against the difficult 
working conditions. Faced with unprecedented social problems, Romanian authorities 
used the militarily to bring people to order. At least 2,000 people were arrested. Some of 
the protesters, among them Gheorghiu-Dej and the rest of the future group “home 
communists,” were imprisoned. In the communists‟ world-view, the year 1933 was 
extremely important. It marked the formation of the “home communists” group that in 
1952 would win the internal party struggles against the Moscow group. Consequently, to 
construct a national narrative, the communist rhetoric emphasized the participation of 
Gheorghiu-Dej‟s Central Committee for Action in the 1933 events.70 After the war, 
communist propaganda about the events of 1933 stressed military abuses, as well as the 
protests and actions carried out against these abuses at all industrial sites.
71
 It also revised 
history to depict Gheorghiu-Dej, really a marginal personality in 1933, as the real 
promoter, leader, and organizer of social protests.
72
  
Reiterated periodically, this story conveyed the symbolic evolution of the typical 
party leader. Ideologically, the story framed a highly hierarchical system in which 
historical events uncovered the working class‟s historical legitimacy. Whether it was 
Gheorghiu-Dej or any other worker, interactions and conflicts with the old regime 
revealed successive steps in the formation of communist consciousness. The communist 
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leaders used any available occasion to integrate in the public discourse events of their 
personal past, to invent a tradition, and later to transform it into legitimating narratives.
73
  
The anti-imperialist attitude had to ritualize the public life through the generalized 
involvement of society.
74
 Socialist-realist was full of legitimizing stories and heroic 
figures. Their meaningful life experience conveyed for readers ideological meanings that 
the regime hoped would transmit desirable models of human conduct.
75
 The story of 
Budoy and Atanasiu conveyed messages of growth by means of self-consciousness and 
retrospection, and not on mandatory regulations. The story illustrated the already 
theorized function of the built environment by advertising the urban experience as 
thinkable, viable, and rewarding both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was 
practiced.  
Moreover, through a system of material reward, architecture mediated between 
the state, which owned the legal instruments to build, and the workers, who needed 
dwellings to be happy and efficient in the plant. This was not out of place, as Victoria 
Bonnell has pointed out,  
 
Arts, after World War II, no longer had exhortation as their main theme; 
they no longer called upon people to perform superhuman feats… Hard 
work was of course part of the new and blissful postwar world projected 
by political posters, but now considerable emphasis was placed on the 
satisfaction and reward derived from work well done and even on 
contemplation of the good life provided by Soviet society.
76
  
 
In Hunedoara, the relative energetic activity of 1947-1949 suggested an “enthusiasm of 
the beginning” and shortage of living space. Accordingly, by the end of 1948, authorities 
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officially cheered the project‟s success, and several newspapers published images and 
photographs of the new city. They advertised the city and formulated a slogan “fortress of 
steel and workers.”77 Surprisingly, nobody at that time criticized the Garden City‟s 
individual dwellings and plots in Hunedoara. Quite the opposite! In Scânteia, publishers 
proudly presented the cases of Mezei Dumitru, Chilianu Gheorghe, Beches Ladislau, and 
Cazan Stefan, young workers who had been twice blessed: on 7 November 1948, they 
received from the Party comfortable dwellings to live in, and after having learned the 
Matulinet Soviet steel production method, surpassed the daily production plans by twenty 
per cent.
78
  
Sociologically, the advertisement of workers‟ names and their professional 
accomplishments, because of Soviet prowess in producing steel, implied that 
industrialization would provide the basis for a new Soviet system of social cohesion. It 
also suggested discursively the points initially expressed in the October 1945 political 
program and afterwards reiterated periodically. The practice of rewarding workers with 
dwellings raises the issue of how effective the buildings were in making them feel 
communists, and also how well the state replicated the Soviet model. As Foucault writes, 
buildings do not “simply represent power, nor have an inherent political significance.”79 
Still, on 7 November 1948 when the “Garden City” dwelling assembly had been 
inaugurated, the Association for Strengthening of the Soviet Romanian Friendship 
(ARLUS) organized public manifestations and meetings where 3,000 workers stated their 
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gratitude for their daily lives‟ spectacular modernization. Pictures of Stalin and Lenin, of 
the local leaders, red flags, and banners pointed out the Soviet character of the 
commemoration.
80
  
Strictly, from the officials‟ viewpoint, the Garden City model was authentically 
Soviet.
81
 Yet, this opinion‟s expression and perceived correctness depended substantially 
on both the public‟s capacity to distinguish, evaluate, and employ the advertised political 
criteria. It was not a given that the inhabitants sought to embody the Soviet program of 
modernization, or to bring their heterodox thoughts into line with what they were 
expected to believe. This dissociation was confirmed, to some extent, in May 1949, when 
a monthly report made by the Education Department about the ARLUS celebration of 
November 1948 judged the popular involvement and interest to be rather unsatisfactory. 
Authorities identified spectators by various age groups. Politicians acknowledged the 
poor quality of the propagandists‟ ideological training and the institutional chaos in 
which they functioned. They also noted that “the youth changes its attitude and mentality 
rapidly”: therefore, for propagandistic efficiency, any upcoming action was to be focused 
particularly upon this age category.
82
 In line with the ideological demands of the moment, 
the concern about how particular age categories responded to the political rhetoric proved 
that “the Zhdanovshchina [the Soviet-imposed crackdown on the arts] and anti-
cosmopolitan campaign were not only designed to frighten writers and intellectuals into 
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conformity, they were also meant to rouse the young and radical against ideological 
complacency.”83 
Ideally, the Soviet hero would dwell in an apartment that the state had built 
according to the principles of socialist-realist architecture. This type of individual would 
be so perfect that he could judge, from one single glance at a picture, the hierarchical 
relationships between figures, the architects‟ ideological intentions, and the moral 
character of the socialist world that was emerging from the Second World War as a 
strong warrior against the imperialist camp. In postwar Romania, the regime had to 
assemble as much positive socialist evidence as possible in order to convince the masses 
about the legitimacy of the new rule. The state traded steel for dwellings, and equally 
made use of the modernist buildings as products committed to the advancement of a 
socialist planned economy that did not yet exist in 1948 Romania. Thus, official organs 
like Scânteia presumed that, in Romania, as in other socialist countries, “Garden City” 
buildings would provide the basis for a new Soviet culture and consciousness.  
 
4. Conclusion:  
Broadly speaking, the questions raised by the finished product in Hunedoara addressed 
both the decision-making and the planning rhetoric. Illustrated as independent programs 
pursuing parallel drives commissioned by an ambiguous cultural strategy, the program of 
the late 1940s displayed, however, strategies undertaken by embryonic institutional 
organizations, which for the time being employed separately the state‟s modernizing 
rhetoric. While newspapers mirrored the establishment of a massive administrative 
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system of image management, the propagandist message got closer to what Sheila 
Fitzpatrick has defined as “the discourse of socialist realism,” a form of publicized ideal 
to counterbalance chaotic realities.
84
 Architecturally, however, the modernist formula 
“form follows function” was juxtaposed over the socialist-realist rhetoric “national in 
form and socialist in content.” On one hand, the socialist-realist requirement to endow 
urban space with a distinctive topological identity failed to materialize because the 
socialist-realist rhetoric had no influence whatsoever upon the architectural product. On 
the other hand, the city‟s positioning within the national program of social modernization 
was uncertain since between the designers‟ building effort and the politicians‟ project 
there was a gap unlikely to be bridged. Therefore, once the first phase in the building 
process had been concluded, the planners were facing a difficult endeavor in addressing 
on the one hand the authorities‟ increasing demand for dwellings and on the other the 
pressing socialist-realist elements that had to be assimilated into the architectural 
vocabulary. Such a state of affairs immediately shifted the building rhetoric from 
designers‟ practices toward political and institutional control over the building program. 
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IV 
The second phase (1949-1951) 
A member of the Communist Party since the war, N. Bădescu launched at the AST 
congress in October 1949, a campaign against cosmopolitanism and imperialist bourgeois 
architecture. In January 1950, Arhitectura published his speech integrally, and in the 
years to come, other authors frequently cited fragments. Politically legitimated by 
Gheoghiu-Dej‟s ideas delivered at the party‟s congress in 1948, Bădescu‟s discourse 
sketched the future architecture‟s rhetoric necessarily as “national in form and socialist in 
content.” He identified both cosmopolitanism and its reverse nationalism with reflections 
of bourgeois culture that divided the working class, and opted instead for patriotism and 
proletariat‟s internationalism, arisen from workers‟ critical view of the past and their 
revolutionary engagement with the future. Architecturally, Bădescu launched a beclouded 
attack against Le Corbusier‟s “five architectural principles” and CIAM four-point urban 
scheme, both associated with the expensive constructive solutions of functionalism, and 
argued that such forms of building contravened with the aspirations of the working class. 
Blaming cosmopolitanism for “denying the folk art‟s value,” he further criticized both the 
ideology that fueled the modernist building programs and the finished outcomes.
1
 
Bădescu‟s discourse circumscribed profound transformations at the level of ideological 
speech in terms of “nation,” “people,” and “tradition” occurred around that time in 
Romania, which rallied institutional crystallization and called for political decision-
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making‟s involvement into the building program.2 Institutionally, “from 1950 on, the 
organizational, doctrinal, and aesthetic Soviet program, henceforth the absolute Soviet 
standard, could be applied and adapted (in accordance with the principle of „national in 
form and socialist in content‟), with all of its propagandistic detours and its entire generic 
or thematic hierarchy.”3 Research campaigns to evaluate the local dwelling customs came 
to complete the decision-making‟s dynamic and their findings aimed to integrate quickly 
and efficiently the new urban solutions into a supposedly authentic socialist-realist 
Romanian tradition. Nevertheless, since the institutional configuration framed the texture 
of society during the Cold War, the construction of Hunedoara during the end of the 
1940s and the beginning of the 1950s should be approached in terms of individual 
responsibility versus institutional engagement, and of architectural knowledge and 
professional debate versus political-mindedness.
4
 This chapter revolves around the 
stylistic evolution of architecture within the city, from modernist designs towards Soviet 
constructs, and the institutional crystallization inside the socialist state that was coupled 
with the leadership‟s strengthening within the Communist Party, and aims to uncover 
how the first components of the socialist-realist aesthetic were absorbed by the Romanian 
architectural vocabulary and how this process was illustrated locally in Hunedoara.  
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1. Making Space Political:  
Although the plans for Casa Scânteii had been finalized in Moscow in 1949, its building 
did not begin until the end of 1950.
5
 Coincidently, or not, in 1951, construction began in 
Hunedoara of several public buildings – a railway station, a hospital, the house of culture 
– where architects used decorative elements similar those in Bucharest. The public 
buildings‟ construction in Hunedoara started after several years of institutional 
correspondence between local authorities and governmental officials. Demand for a 
House of Culture, for instance, arose by the beginning of 1948, when officials started to 
plan the cultural activities organized by ARLUS.
6
  
In Hunedoara, the public buildings‟ architectural style echoed the Byzantine 
tradition. Of the three, the House of Culture employed an asymmetrical planning and 
structure. The buildings in Hunedoara varied in form and finish, with individual 
decorative motifs derived from what, in 1949, officials from Moscow and Bucharest 
agreed upon to be the traditional Romanian national style. The buildings were 
transformed into symbols of socialist realism, and classical features such as columns, 
balustrades, fountains, adorning the facades were introduced into architecture. Both the 
“Casa Scânteii” in Bucharest and the public buildings in Hunedoara had similar 
decorations: arches, grouped columns, Byzantine decorations, semi-circle windows.
7
 
Architects borrowed Byzantine ornaments, removed their religious significance, and,  
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Figure 4.1 “Casa Scânteii,” Bucharest (1950-1953). Exterior view. 
 
                  
Figure 4.2 South-west façade The House of Culture,                                 Figure 4.3 “Casa Scânteii,” detail   
Hunedoara (1950-1951). Architects Radu Berindei and                              of façade.  
A. Ghelber. Courtesy C. Gaina. 
 
    
Figure 4.4 “Casa Scânteii,” Bucharest. Detail             Figure 4.5 The House of Culture, Hunedoara. Detail  
façade.         West wing façade. (Photo 2005). 
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Figure 4.6 The House of Culture, Hunedoara. Details East wing facade. (Photo 2005).  
 
Figure 4.7 A “Casa Scânteii,” Bucharest. Entrance detail.              
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 B The House of Culture,  
Hunedoara. Entrance detail. (Photo 2005). 
                                   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 C “Casa Scânteii,” Bucharest. 
Façade detail.         
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through an impressive manipulation of well-known Soviet emblems, created a new    
Romanian socialist realist style, which was based on Neo-Classical style. Yet, in spite of 
socialist realism‟s tenet of critically assimilating the historical heritage by means of 
architectural motifs, optioned for Byzantine forms and marginalized the regional 
individuality.
8
  
In both cases, architects employed at the State Committee for Architecture and 
Constructions finalized the blueprints. Until the early 1950s, communists‟ interest in 
aesthetic institutionalization had been scant, which as Piotr Piotrowski has pointed out, 
revealed not their lack of interest in architecture‟s evolution, or any cultural production 
for that matter, but concerns in “analyzing the system of power, ideological constructs, 
and economic transformation.”9 Individual buildings, therefore, were commissioned from 
the teams led by politically accepted architects, while the finished outcomes, such as the 
Casa Scânteii, were considered individual creations and awarded the state prises for 
merit. By the end of 1949, architects returned from Moscow with the correct socialist-
realist models, and showed them to other practitioners. A. Ghelber and R. Berindei, the 
designers responsible for the public projects in Hunedoara, searched the plans of Casa 
Scânteii, copied some geometrical elements, and included them in the blueprints they 
were working on.
10
 Architecture was, as ever, slower than the other arts to change. 
Therefore, it is likely that these professional interactions occurred sometime during late 
1949 and the beginning of 1950, when, ideologically and politically, the existing 
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institutional framework encouraged a culture that shunned accountability, and produced 
an assimilation of the socialist-realist form before a proper understanding of its content.
11
  
On one hand, architecturally, the socialist-realist forms utilized by the end of 1949 
were not used to express the official political viewpoint alone. The public buildings in 
Hunedoara legitimated a number of different artistic practices, which, inside the newly 
organized socialist system, allowed the negotiation of the rhetoric‟s non-visual character 
through visual reminiscences. In this way, they unveiled a profession held together by 
commonly accepted values, driven from above by institutions, which produced and 
disseminated ideology from the state. In other words, architectural production was 
derived from a combination of force and consent.
12
 To a degree, the public buildings in 
Hunedoara organically continued practices undertaken prior to World War II by 
Romanian public building programs. 
Consequently, by the end of the 1940s, confronted with the ambiguous task to 
create a rhetoric “national in form and socialist in content,” Romanian architects built on 
the pre-existing architectural tradition. As already pointed out in the second chapter of 
this thesis, since the early 1920s, Romania had undertaken one of the most intense 
campaigns of nation building in the region, aiming to integrate the newly established 
provinces into the unitary state. Concerned with both administrative and cultural issues of 
reorganization, the state imagined a unitary discourse that had to integrate heterogeneous 
practices into a homogenous cultural and bureaucratic tradition. From this perspective, 
the process initiated at the beginning of the 1920s, “was not necessarily the product of 
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modernization and industrialization but the anticipating development of any significant 
component of modernization.”13 Architecturally, a synthesis of Neo-Classicism and 
traditional Byzantine geometries fashioned the moment‟s national visual vocabulary. 
After the establishment of communism, however, the state‟s project converted and built 
on the former ideas and saw the community of that moment as the “fairly recent product 
of the organization of human beings into large centrally educated culturally homogenous 
units which fueled their sense of national belonging consisted in the rise of an industrial 
society.”14 After the war, economic and financial strategies prevailed in the national 
discourse. They illustrated a relation between industry/modernity and nation-building 
tactics: as one scholar notes “just as the state in industrially backward societies can 
substitute budgetary policies for the organic accumulation of capital to generate the sums 
needed for industrialization, so the state can presumably substitute cultural policies for 
the structures of industrial societies, which are prerequisites for the development of an 
idea of a nation.”15 In terms of architecture, once confronted with the Soviets‟ visual 
practices and cultural strategies, Romanian communists reinvented a tradition that had 
been previously invented in the 1920s. Politically, from the communists‟ point of view, it 
is quite possible that, while rejuvenating the economic program initiated in Hunedoara by 
the mid-1940s, the rapid assimilation of decorative elements employed practices of power 
constructed to implement a “hierarchization of images.”16 They had to pursue a 
reorganization of political meanings, albeit, in the style of socialist realism, public 
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edifices and not dwellings had been initially constructed. The Casa Scânteii in Bucharest 
and the public buildings in Hunedoara placed the significance of the Soviet politics, 
institutions, and ideology in the centre of the city, thus marginalizing any form of local 
tradition, and making the language of the official government coincide with the language 
of the architecture. The ideal architectural model, canonized in Moscow, acted as a safety 
net, providing the state, whose authority was still threatened, with double security. The 
monumentality of the various versions of Byzantine decorative elements would reflect, 
the communists argued, the country‟s immense economic and cultural achievements.17  
 
2. Second Building Phase (1949-1951): 
In 1949, the accommodation capacity of Hunedoara did not exceed 8,000 inhabitants. In 
spite of industrial programs elaborated by the party during the second phase of 
construction (1949-1951), the ideological discrepancies of the previous years continued. 
However, this stage could be easily viewed as a transitional one, where socialist realism‟s 
rhetoric grew stronger within the official discourse. Already by the end of 1947, the 
Romanian officials contacted the local authorities in Hunedoara for starting preliminary 
research necessary for the systematization plan. The data gathered locally during 1948 
was sent to Bucharest where the Architects‟ Association was appointed to undertake the 
groundwork planning.
18
 In 1949 at the IPC (the Urbanism Department in the Ministry of 
Construction) headquarters in Bucharest, Stefan Popovici and Adrian Gheorghiu began 
research for drawing the systematization plan for Hunedoara. The initial research, 
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conducted in close collaboration with sociologists and economists aimed to sketch the 
socio-demographic character of the region. Announced as a pioneering drive in post-war 
Romania, the research focused on social and demographic details and had to identify 
solutions to facilitate a shift in the regional structure from an agrarian-based to an 
industrialized economy. The systematization project‟s focus was, of course, to name 
solutions to implement locally the Soviet urban typologies.
19
  
 In response to the systematization project elaborated by the end of 1949, a group 
of architects organized in Bucharest, at the headquarters of both IPC and ARLUS, 
discussions regarding the socialist dwellings‟ patterns. Architects claimed they were 
inspired by “the Soviet ethnographic methodology of regional analysis and research,” and 
N. Bădescu‟s 1950 article, “Against cosmopolitism and bourgeois architecture,” which 
opposed cosmopolitism and formalism to socialist realism. In this respect, the Urbanism 
Department recommended the establishment of two new structures under the Department 
of Research of the Minister of Construction that had to gather relevant documentary 
material on architectural heritage and translate integrally into Romanian Soviet 
ideological texts. Furthermore, in 1950, the Urbanism Department organized two 
successive research campaigns in Hunedoara, which had to center around regional 
architecture‟s typology and construction materials. Architects explained their choice to 
focus on Hunedoara because “there was about to be created an important industrial centre 
and a socialist city, and because it was located in Transylvania, where issues related to 
national arts were more complicated.”20 As such, the campaign in Hunedoara, started in 
1949, was the beginning of extensive professional debates on architect‟s social role and 
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use of vernacular heritage as national art, and announced changes that were about to 
shaken from the ground up both the profession and the planning practice. The arguments 
placed behind the program in Hunedoara conveyed a socialist-realist agenda in line with 
previously expressed principles of architecture‟s social function. The program should be 
read on two levels.  
On one hand, by the beginning of 1951, Petre Antonescu, a long-standing figure 
of the Romanian architecture observed that “the local heritage of the Hunedoara region 
uncovered an architecture capable to reflect reality and endow each building with a 
natural beauty.”21 The appeal to regional architecture in creating patterns for social 
dwellings targeted Bădescu‟s idea that socialist-realist architecture had to be “national in 
form and socialist in content.” Accordingly, the local vernacular architecture would be 
studied from the perspective of space distribution, buildings‟ proportions, and 
connections between form and function, and would provide the designers with the bases 
for future socialist-realist architecture and standardized construction patterns.
22
  
On the other hand, the systematization project, drawn for the region, opened up 
discussion on the issue of standardization in construction, development of large urban 
estates, and later use of pre-fabricated materials in buildings‟ manufacture. ARLUS and 
the Ministry of Construction hosted a lecture series, featuring Gustav Gusti, H. 
Delavrancea, and Daniel Farb, which was soon followed by several planning contests at 
the IPC.
23
 The jury, led by Gustav Gusti, now transformed into a local theoretician of 
Soviet architectural ideology, selected several dwelling‟ types and argued that they could 
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provide the architects with a facile start in planning, which would help them eliminate 
“the cosmopolite influence though the use of regional forms.”24 The projects proposed 
over-sized variations on the vernacular architecture, in terms of both roof geometry and 
ground imprint, with two-room apartments puzzled together in order to fit the rectangular 
building‟s perimeter. The furnishing solutions were adapted to serve a minimal space of 
no more than 45 square meters per dwelling, while the finishes and amenities were 
distributed according to designers‟ individual preferences. In evaluating the projects, 
resemblance with the traditional building played the main cart.
25
  
In spite of these research campaigns, at the time the second building phase began 
in Hunedoara, neither the systematization plan was approved, nor the dwelling pattern 
typified. Nevertheless, the demand for dwellings made officials complete a new urban 
project in Hunedoara, which was the outcome of the aforementioned professional 
interactions. Designed by D. Hardt, Cezar Lăzărescu, R. Moisescu, and V. Perceac, it was                                                                                       
constructed between 1949 and 1951. The project, initiated in 1949 parallel with the First 
Annual Economic plan, which had foreseen an industrial boom, and finalized in 1951, 
proposed a more compact urban structure, with two-storey buildings.
26
 The blocks had 
two-room apartments, and the interior space‟s dimensions have been substantially 
narrowed down from eighty to forty square meters per dwelling.
27
 These flats had spatial 
planning featuring rooms that opened one into another without a corridor or hallway, 
which affected the functionality of the dwelling and allowed inhabitants little privacy. 
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Out of twenty considered, only six buildings were constructed. In 1950, the authorities 
hoped to gain “a maximal satisfaction by permanently meeting the material and cultural 
needs of the entire local community by successfully engaging technical findings in the 
industry of construction in the almost perfect socialist society.”28  
                                                   
Figure 4.8 Exterior view traditional peasant house,                    Figure 4.8 Collective dwellings, Hunedoara 
Southern Transylvanian area.                                                             (1949-1951), Entrance detail. Architects 
D. Hardt et al. (Photo 2008). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Collective dwellings, Hunedoara (1949-1951). Exterior view. D. Hardt et al. (Photo 2008). 
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3. Putting Principle into Practice:  
In 1951, the first Five-Year Plan of the Romanian economy began.
29
 The Plan revolved 
around the great building projects of communism, such as industrialization, urbanization, 
and economic integration into the Soviet structure. In 1951 in Hunedoara, the government 
reorganized the plant in order to double steel production.
30
 In the same year, the working 
class “unanimously and enthusiastically” recommended that the Romanian Council of 
Ministers rename the Steel Plant the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Steelworks.
31
 On 13 July 
1951, only three months after local elections that gave Dej more control over 
administrative structures, the Romanian Government approved the project of 
systematizing the city. Furthermore, the systematizing project was included in the Five 
Year Plan. This practically reconfirmed the political engagement towards the finalization 
of the project, as the Soviet organizational prototype required. The First Five-Year Plan, 
along with the national reconstruction program, ensured the socialist content of 
architecture.
 32
 
Politically, the renaming of the Steel Works illustrated a particular model of 
patronage where all tried to personally supervise the implementation of the projects while 
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“having their own people working for them.”33 For Romania in general, and for 
Hunedoara in particular, the effort to increase the Communist Party‟s coherence and to 
reduce the disunity within the organization was successful, and the building process 
became more likely to succeed. In 1951, in Hunedoara, the supervision of the urban 
investments was entrusted to Chivu Stoica, Minister of Industry, and one of Gheorghiu-
Dej‟s most fervent political supporters. Stoica was also responsible for the reorganization 
of the Steel Plant in the city, and in this quality, he supervised the expropriation campaign 
of the land where the city was to be built.
34
 Within the political scene of the time, 
Gheorghiu-Dej‟s power position was still uncertain. Thus, by appointing a member of the 
government in this key position, Gheorghiu-Dej implemented a system where, ideally, 
local problems were easily traced and eliminated. 
Similar to the rest of Eastern European countries, to fix the mistakes of the past 
and, to unify socialist-realist practices, the Romanian authorities first initiated the 
institutionalization of the architectural profession by abolishing, in 1951, the architects‟ 
private practices and transforming them into employees of large state planning bureaus.
35
 
This move towards institutional conformity, which further made the architect responsible 
for the built environment‟s ideological discourse, dislodged the autonomous individual 
artist and replaced his business with structured office practices and ideological 
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architectural training, each of them having an equal impact upon the architectural 
outcome. In Hunedoara, for instance, the recently established State Committee for 
Architecture and Constructions, an organ responsible to the Romanian Council of 
Ministers led by Gheorghiu-Dej, executed the planning and the topographical urban 
development projects.
36
 
A document released by the Romanian Government, “Instructions for the 
Executions of the Topographic Plans of the Cities and Popular Centers,” stipulated the 
new establishment‟s functioning and internal organization, and made illegal any private 
design company that had been active in the field until that moment.
37
 In the city, the 
central government approved specific regulations for the urban space‟s aesthetic 
appearances in terms of both street organization and façade decoration. These 
instructions, which addressed the dwelling sector particularly, provided directives for 
dwellings‟ construction and advanced standardized building patterns. After 1951, changes 
occurred not only in the urban planning principles, but in the building technology, as 
well. Initially introduced in Romania in 1950, “hard-core” modern concepts like 
“prefabrication,” “standardization,” and “urban control” became ubiquitous after 1951.38 
The only method to solve the massive need for buildings, prefabricated materials 
permitted the standardization of project designs and construction solutions: they also 
unified the artistic appearance of buildings using industrially produced architraves, 
capitals, and columns, etc. This solution was extremely advantageous, because it reduced 
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the term of project‟s completion and lowered the building costs, while ideologically it 
successfully addressed the issue of formalism in planning and design.
39
 
At stake in these decisions was the absolute control the party hoped to acquire, as 
it defines its institutions as “partial sources of social right, the seat of de facto founding 
authority, a certain task or enterprise, and a postulated, a priori consensus.”40 The State 
Committee for Architecture and Constructions advised the executive committee of the 
city‟s City Hall to establish, within its structures, an office of architecture to supervise the 
systematization plan.
41
 They demanded order and commitment from everybody 
responsible so that the city‟s socialist building would be successfully completed.42 
Constantin Ieremski was appointed as chief-architect of the city.
43
 An extended meeting 
of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee held on 19 and 20 August 1953 
further stressed those decisions.
44
 Yet, one year later, on 24 November 1954, the first 
problems occurred. Initially, the local employees complained that there simply was no 
space necessary for the separate office. Later, lack of qualified personnel and financial 
resources delayed the fulfillment of the legislative regulation to such an extent that the 
recently opened structure‟s responsibilities overlapped with those of the executive 
committee within the city hall. This generated a detour of financial resources towards 
other departments and structures of the city hall, leaving the systematization office unable 
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to carry out its duties. The separate systematization office affiliated with city hall was 
closed. 
45
  
After such institutionalization, the transmission of ideas and their implementation 
encountered fewer difficulties. There existed at least two very effective tools for putting 
the government‟s wishes into practice. First, state ownership of urban land achieved 
though expropriations within the city limits, which fixed its value into parameters set by 
the state. Second, social order, which would express the emergence of the all-mighty 
party-state within the Romanian society where institutions were cast to employ its policy 
on one hand, and on the other the supposedly identification of the communists‟ program 
with the masses‟ would then turn successfully. Both methods were used. In 1951, the 
government declared the project in Hunedoara to be of national importance, initiated a 
concerted campaign of expropriations under the command of Constantin Iarunski, and to 
begin with, handed over one hundred hectares to municipal authorities for the building of 
the future socialist city.
46
  
 
4. Ideological Discourse:  
In 1952, an itinerant exhibition of the Romanian socialist architecture was shown in 
Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. Among the exhibits counted the plans of the Casa 
Scânteii, the constructions in Bucharest planned between 1949 and 1951, and a detailed 
overview of the Hunedoara project. While presented as a Romanian experiment in the 
socialist systematization of the cities, a pioneering approach toward both building 
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patterns‟ standardization, and “national in form and socialist in content” concept‟s 
implementation, the case of Hunedoara did not unveil a long-term solution to the 
architects‟ dilemma.47 In light of this, the socialist-realist agenda continued to attract 
everybody‟s attention and in 1952, the Romanian Communist Party ideologues 
emphasized that until that very moment “the collectivity” in Hunedoara had not found 
any means to express itself while living in the “Garden City.”48 Their points of view 
seamed, nevertheless, to flow in a logical succession, which circumscribed both 
ideological and political transformations recently noticed and called for dismantling the 
ideology that had generated the previous building projects. 
The 1950s building discourse focused upon several levels of theoretical 
argumentation: the production, the distribution, and the reception of the city‟s built 
environment. The discourses deconstructed systematically the modernist project of the 
“Garden City” in Hunedoara, to some extent even the hybrid urban solutions of the 
beginning of the 1950s, and questioned the significance of workers‟ quotidian experience 
by emphasizing the human space‟s socio-economic symbolic meaning. This mechanism, 
which illustrated the planning structures and decision-makers‟ preoccupation with 
creating urban benchmarks that would activate the readers‟ perception, came not from 
below, but from above, where professional artists and architects began to be trained to 
manufacture a readily intelligible socialist art created for easy access to the masses. Party 
architects, among whom Locar and Lăzărescu voiced vehemently the significance of 
social function of architecture in Hunedoara, identified the key concepts of the correct 
socialist-realist program: beautiful buildings to fuel the cultural ambitions of the masses 
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and establish the topological identity of the city, the architects‟ ideological training, and 
the planning program‟s institutionalization.   
Firstly, in line with Nicolae Bădescu, Lăzărescu integrated his discourse into the 
postwar socialist-realist rhetoric actively disseminated by the Romanian cultural media 
since 1947, when the mass media already controlled by ARLUS began to publish Andrei 
Zhdanov‟s ideas and articles, and produced effects shortly after at the Communist Party‟s 
second congress in 1948.
49
 In 1951, another collection of essays, “Against Bourgeois Art 
and Aesthetics,” edited by the VOKS leader Kemenev, undertook on the one hand the 
defense of the Renaissance as a positive historical phenomenon and, on the other, the 
categorization of any modernist project as an instrument of American imperialism.
50
 
Ideologically, Kemenev restated socialist realism‟s major tenet of critically assimilating 
the historic heritage and setting connections between the artistic product and social 
justice on the one hand, and on the other the polarization between the communist East 
and the capitalist West. This was a rigorous visual censorship campaign, which quickly 
produced effects. The ideas articulated by Lăzărescu revolved around those very issues 
approached by the Russian ideologue.  
Distinguishing between the Soviet and the European city, Lăzărescu made official 
the party‟s denunciation of “the faceless international architectural uniformity” of the 
international architectural modernism.
51
 With cubicle houses imported from the West, 
this building system had no organic continuity with the vernacular tradition of Romanian 
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architecture, Lăzărescu argued.52 He regarded the “Garden City” in Hunedoara as 
outdated and reactionary.
53
 Accordingly, the general line initially expressed in the Soviet 
Union by Zhdanov and Kemenev, and later in Romania, by Lăzărescu among others, 
consisted in rejecting any artistic interaction or dialogue between communist visual 
strategies and non-Soviet ideologies or “modernist traditions.”54 Thus, 
 
The negative example of Western modernity, rather than the positive 
reference to “the national heritage,” was globally invoked to justify most 
of the arguments of this new current. The anti-imperialist campaign can 
therefore be seen as an application, in the visual art, of the policy against 
“servility to the West” with its attendant “anti-cosmopolitan” motif.55  
 
Lăzărescu criticized the architects for giving to much priority to building costs. This, he 
said, caused housing standards to decrease and small dwellings lacking “artistic 
expression” to be built. The workers‟ houses had roofs with no cornices, sheer walls, and 
no window architraves or raised lintels, no capitals or pediments, no colors aside from the 
compound shades of white, beige, gray, and black. Lăzărescu accused the “Garden City” 
of repeating the mistakes of the past: monotonous buildings, high economic costs, and 
finally, disregard for a city‟s individual topological, cultural, or social identity and 
beauty.
56
 His idea of beauty corresponded with the socialist-realist rhetoric professed in 
the Soviet Union since the 1930s, when Stalin‟s henchman, Lazar Kaganovici stated:  
 
The proletariat does not just want buildings; it does not simply want to 
live comfortably. It wants its buildings to be beautiful. And it wants its 
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housing, its architecture, its towns, to be more beautiful than in all the 
countries of Europe and America.
57
  
 
By the end of the Second World War, however, beauty associated with the building 
program was transformed into an intrinsic ideological value; according to Leonid Heller, 
post-war socialist realism “acquired an aesthetic character becoming the bearer of beauty 
reproduced by means of art.”58 Aesthetics expressed a beautiful reality, immediate, and 
ubiquitous, already in place.  
Secondly, Lăzărescu delineated the parameters of a real modern socialist urban 
space. Because “the previous constructions had been so small,” the “revolutionary 
character of the socialist worker had not been fully expressed by that environment, 
therefore serious damage had been caused to the good life of the working people, and the 
cost of living had become even more expensive.”59 Accordingly, the correct architecture 
had to be understood by the masses, to express reality in its revolutionary development, 
to address the masses‟ cultural needs of beauty and monumentality. To be meaningful, 
architects had to embody the most valuable local traditions of the people, and to transmit 
national sentiments and socialist aspirations toward the revolutionary development of 
daily life. However, “Garden City” houses looked a lot like those “minimal working 
dwellings” built prior to World War II in Romania. Accordingly, the most modern art of 
the moment, namely socialist realism, could not look like Western art.
60
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Typically for an anti-modernist crusade, Lăzărescu stressed that these first forty-
four buildings were tainted by cosmopolitanism and formalism, a concern that in the 
context of the moment was emblematic for the socialist realist aesthetics‟ infusion and the 
institutional crystallization. Thus, the 1952 architectural discourse employed the concept 
of “national in form and socialist in content” to circumscribe a thorough critique of the 
early 1950s‟ constructions, too. In spite of some voices inclined to emphasize the positive 
aspects within the program, other criticized the inappropriate use of local traditions, 
which eventually unveiled lack of understanding of the “national in form” concept, or 
worse presence of consistent cosmopolitan influences within the IPC. For instance, 
archaizing geometries, with medieval and baroque reminiscences used extensively in the 
detriment of vernacular forms as was noticed at the local hospital, continued to serve 
cosmopolitan trends and marginalized national influences. The public space within the 
city thus had a medieval look where some public buildings resembled a monastery.
61
  
The purpose of any socialist building program was to disseminate optimism 
amongst the inhabitants. Lăzărescu identified the “Garden City” with cultural decadence 
and pessimism, judging its building proposals socially impracticable. He further took the 
side of classicism, claiming that it could reincarnate a popular sense of cultural tradition 
and social enthusiasm. Criticizing the Garden City‟s organization of space, (even though 
he himself had been involved in the early stages of construction) Lăzărescu pointed to the 
square, the boulevard, and the monument as the major determinants of the socialist urban 
fabric, thus suggesting the quartals.
62
 His intervention continued a line of thinking going 
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back in 1950, when an account published by Arhitectura presented the program in 
Hunedoara as the start of the Soviet planning in Romania. Accordingly, Gustav Gusti 
drew the first typified dwellings and identified an urban solution, consisting of both space 
disposition and buildings‟ facades, as a closer version of socialist realism. Scânteia 
further voiced the party‟s involvement into the building program.63 Denouncing the initial 
building project, Lăzărescu questioned the real impact that the older buildings could have 
upon people living in them.
 64
   
Lăzărescu opined that these flows had emerged because “although talented 
architects were involved, the teams did not have an ideological training.”65 The architect 
was not to look critically at the new political and social system; his role was to support 
the regime and to encourage ordinary people to build a socialist society. As Heller has 
pointed out, “in order to be perceived ideologically committed all artwork‟s elements had 
to contribute to the uncovering of a dominant idea, which functioned as a structural focus 
of and chief motivation for these elements.”66 Authorities, therefore, were to guard 
against any ideological impurity, because, as Alexandru Locar, another architect involved 
in the planning of the Hunedoara project, had pointed out “there can be many enemies 
and saboteurs. Class vigilance requires full attention to prevent such mistakes in the 
future.”67 Two facts emerge from this. On one hand, such discourse introduced the 
typology of the ideal professional architect, who had to be part of the ideological 
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enterprise. On the other, it stressed institutional involvement in the country‟s building 
programs, which could not be brought to fruition unless a coherent decision-making 
structure organized the actions and projects set by the party and its ideology.  
 
Conclusion: 
The communist program of modernization called for planning structures‟ institutional 
crystallization within the Romanian party-state. Therefore, the evolution of socialist-
realist architecture was constructed on two levels. On one hand, the Romanian 
Communist Party seamed to be continuing an ideological campaign began in 1949 that 
consisted of rejecting cosmopolitism and formalism parallel with organization‟s internal 
solidification and institutional cohesion in all areas of the state leadership. On the other 
hand, the role of planning structures in this dynamic was framed by the degree to which 
these structures‟ priorities came to overlap the party‟s objectives. Accordingly, by the end 
of the 1940s, aware of the increasing demand for clear ideological benchmarks inside the 
urban perimeters architects had constructed, political decision-makers undertook dramatic 
actions to facilitate the public‟s effective reading of the built environment. The cultural 
capital needed for architecture consisted of academic qualifications and educational 
attainments. It employed the complex interaction of state structures, architectural 
professional organizations, and political ideologies. Whereas, documents like the 
“Instructions for the Execution of the Topographic Plans of the Cities and Popular 
Centers” focused upon the production and transformation of space, they also played a 
central role in creating an interface between the state and the building institutions, in 
effect transforming the architect into a planner. This transformation, which began to 
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redefine the built environment‟s social function by emphasizing architecture‟s 
educational role, integrated the city more effectively into the socialist society and, albeit 
by coercion, solved partially the institutional discrepancies existent inside the state 
system.  
 91 
V 
The Socialist-Realist City (1951-1954) 
In contrast with Bauhaus formalism and CIAM functionalism, the early 1950s socialist-
realist architectural rhetoric restated the historical function of the urban site within the 
new economic system and “called for the cultural and historic determination of the 
respective city.”1 An inherent critique of the modernist functions of the city, thus, the 
rhetoric opened up a process that implied a re-hierarchization of urban categories within 
the Soviet bloc‟s city spaces.2 In line with such ideas, in 1954 Gheorghe Petraşcu 
employed a retrospective overview of the Romanian architectural trends, as noticed in 
Hunedoara and in other centers throughout the country, and redefined the connection 
between the nature of the urban experience and the designers‟ capacity to convey clearly 
into cultural constructs the physical space of the city, which was otherwise controlled and 
shaped by street distribution, urban networks, and furniture. Arguing that the link 
between form and content would stress the mandatory interdependence between public 
space and the stories it produced, and insisting that urban spaces created after socialist 
realism‟s institutionalization must be what Robin has later referred to as a “cultural base 
for the total education,” the discourse assimilated education to beauty.3  
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Yet, the capacity of the urban space to convey the state‟s politics greatly 
depended upon the inhabitancies‟ willingness to read the buildings accordingly, which 
bounded the politicians and architects‟ discourse to its exclusively official character. 
Therefore, in terms of educating the masses, the social functions of these cultural 
constructs, encompassed eventually the degree to which the newly constructed socialist-
realist spaces served the purposes of beauty and socialist existence, which would be thus 
planned as to provide intimacy for the family life and cultural development, modern 
amenities and furniture on one hand, and on the other, recreation and benefices from the 
collective life within the quartal structure.
4
 In Hunedoara, building upon the institutional 
and legislative solidification of the early 1950s, the project conducted between 1951 and 
1954 followed the Soviet theoretical path and integrated architectural product into the 
national discourse of modernization and social education. This chapter questions the 
state‟s attempts to identify its official political program with the citizens‟ agenda and to 
give institutional structures and the legislative decisions the best form in order to create 
the desired social symbiosis of inhabitants‟ urban experiences and architectural 
interpretations.  
  
1. Building the City:  
While all the buildings constructed in Hunedoara during 1950 (and designed, most likely 
in late 1949) were public buildings, from 1951 onwards, official attention focused upon 
massive investments in dwellings. In 1951, Cezar Lăzărescu, the head of the group 
Urbanism II, which was housed in the Ministry of Constructions, wrote the official 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 44. 
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documentation for the systematization of Hunedoara.
5
 According to the project adopted 
in 1951, by 1970 the Steel Plant was to have 15,500 employees. In planning the 
development strategies, the designers took into account Soviet methods of demographic 
estimation. Accordingly, by 1970 the city was to have 40,000 inhabitants. No fewer than 
30,000 individuals would receive dwellings in the newly built city.
6
 In addition, since in 
1951, Hunedoara‟s total accommodation capacity had not surpassed 8,000 a new 
neighborhood would have to be raised from the ground up if the thousands of projected 
arrivals were to have homes.
7
 Consequently, in November 1952 a last project was drawn 
up for Hunedoara, based on the idea of linking the old “Garden City” with the new one.8 
The plan, initiated by Gheorghe Pavlu, followed the 1951 statement (written by architect 
Radu Laurian, the chief of the urbanism department, and Caesar Lăzărescu, the chief of 
group Urbanism II) and proposed the growth of the city to 30,000 inhabitants.
9
  
 
Figure 5.1 1960s perspective over a 1952 quartal space, Hunedoara. Architects Radu Udroiu et al. 
Courtesy Constantin Gaina.  
                                                 
5
  APMJ-Secretariat, 16/1952, 25. 
6
  Ibid., 45. 
7
  DJASD-PoH, 54/1952, 14. 
8
 G. Porumbescu, “Proiectarea locinţelor muncitoreşti la Hunedoara,” Arhitectură şi Urbanism 6-7 (1952): 
17; I.S.P.R.O.R (Institutul de proiectari) meaning, - The Institute for Building and Design was a structure 
within the Ministry of Constructions. 
9
 Ibid., 19. 
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Figure 5.2 Quartal project (1953).                   Figure 5.3 Ante-project Quartal Plans (1952-1953).  
Detail. From Cezar Lazarescu, “Din         From G. Porumbescu, “Proiectarea locinţelor muncitoreşti la 
experienta proiectarii,” Arhitectura 1               Hunedoara,” Arhitectură şi Urbanism 6-7 (1952): 13. 
(1953): 6. 
 
 
The next step was a project calling for a future increase in the city‟s population by 
one hundred per cent (up to 60,000 inhabitants), elaborated in 1954 by a group from the 
recently established I.S.P.R.O.R under the leadership of the architect Gheorghe 
Petrascu.
10
 This group was to develop new urban and architectural designs in keeping 
with socialist realism in the form that prevailed since 1952.  
In 1954, a new question was raised, though a decision of the Council of Ministers, 
concerning the quest for new ways to eliminate the industrial noxiousness that affected 
inner-city residential areas. Housing workers on large residential estates and constructing 
extensive industrial centers within the plant produced drab and polluted places. 
Investments in the maintenance and renewal of industrial and environmental equipment 
were not made, because doing so would hurt profits. The cheapest alternative was to 
                                                 
10
 Gustav Gusti, “Locuinţa în clădiri în puţine caturi,” Arhitectura RPR  6 (1954): 25. 
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accommodate the population from the industrial centers in the neighboring towns. Based 
on these new conditions, an I.S.P.R.O.R. group headed by architect Adrian Gheroghiu 
(who drew up a project for the micro-region Hunedoara–Deva-Calan) made two 
proposals. The first sought the maximum accommodation in the city of Deva (located 
fifteen kilometers from the city of Hunedoara) and planning to arrange public 
transportation to and from Hunedoara. The second project proposed creating new districts 
for workers that would meet the present requirements in the town of Hunedoara.
11
 In 
May, of the same year, a new plan of construction and urban development was drawn up 
for Hunedoara. It confirmed the building of a new neighborhood, according to the second 
proposal of development, close to the previous socialist-realist district. The planned 
buildings maintained the interior organization of space within socialist-realist apartments 
but were designed with new facades: simple, and visually neutral.
12
  
 
2. The Socialist-Realist Space:  
Ideologically justified through the need for “maximal satisfaction of the material and 
cultural needs of the working class,” the socialist urban site‟s spectacular development 
reflected the importation of Soviet ideology and technology.
13
 As aesthetic rhetoric 
crystallized after 1951, and professional unity of action replaced architectural debates and 
aspirations, designers employed “correct” architecture to express “the decency of the 
working class.”14 There were six apartments on each level, so each apartment ran half the 
width of the building. They had two rooms and a kitchen, a hall, and a bathroom. 
                                                 
11
 Alexandru Locar, “Aspecte ideologice în proiectare,” Arhitectura RPR  5 (1954): 20. 
12
 APMH-Igo, 1955, 2102/III, blueprints A-2/18, A-6/18 apartment buildings 23, 31, 32, 33, 28. 
13
 Lăzărescu, “In legătură cu proiectarea construcţiilor de locuinţe,” Arhitectura RPR 7 (1954): 28. 
14
 DJASD-PoH, 50/1950, 8. 
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Depending on the rooms‟ distribution, the apartments‟ surfaces varied from forty to sixty 
square meters. A general characteristic was the small kitchen. In addition, each dwelling 
had a storage space in the basement and another one in the attic.
15
  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Hunedoara, Exterior view collective dwelling, 1951-1952. Architects Gheorghe Pavlu et al. 
(Photo 2005). 
 
The project implemented between 1951 and 1954 ended up building, along with 
the dwellings, a new train station, a hospital with its own library, one school, one 
kindergarten and nursery school to educate the children and to enable their mothers to 
have a job, two commercial centers, and one public cultural institution with public 
library, a bread fabric, and a cinema.
16
 The hospital, generically named “the house of 
                                                 
15
 APMH-Igo, 1955, 47/1954, 56. 
16
 DJASD-Pref., 13/1952, 9; Drumul socialismului (16 August 1951): 1. 
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rest” was built outside the city‟s perimeter, proved that the role of this kind of institutions 
was insignificant in socialist planning, and workers‟ health was unquestionable.  
    
Figure 5.5 Kindergarten (1952-1953).                            Figure 5.6 Bread Factory (1951-1952).  
(Photo 2008).                                                                    (Photo 2008).  
 
In accordance with socialist realism‟s tenet of recycling past architectural styles, the new 
project made direct links to the architecture of the local historical heritage by “critically” 
developing specific details of new classical and vernacular geometries. The centre, 
Bucharest, opted for Byzantine architecture, while Hunedoara, until 1953, chose Gothic 
brick architecture and local wooden buildings, a trademark of north Romanian, 
Transylvanian cities as inspirational source.
17
 These options all reflected somewhat 
convoluted arguments about the progressive social role of the place in different epochs. 
In the city, architects used the medieval and Baroque style native to the region and 
adapted them to the new facades. 
                                                 
17
 See, Aman, Architecture and Ideology, 112-3. 
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Figure 5.7 Hunedoara, Exterior view collective dwellings, 1952. Architects Radu Udroiu et al. (Photo 
2008). 
 
 
After the Second Party Congress in August 1953, the aesthetic options changed 
somewhat. Previous constructive options associated with local Gothic and Baroque 
architecture were considered inappropriate to employ the local traditions, and searches 
towards correct forms of representation synthesized classical and vernacular 
architecture.
18
 As part of the project of building palaces for the people, apartment blocs, 
along with public buildings, were decorated with columns and other classical elements. 
Furthermore, the gray buildings had to become more colorful and bright. The dimensions 
were sensibly reduced in scale. The entrances, ramps, and stairways were points of 
exchange between public and private space; the regional or the local style with its eaves, 
lucarnes, shutters, and half-timbered gables, delineated a Central European tradition, and 
less a regional specificity.  
                                                 
18
 See I. Silvan, “In legatura cu proiectarea sectinunilor de locuinte,” Arhitectura RPR 1 (1954): 8-10; 
Gustav Gusti, “Locuinta in cladiri cu putine caturi,” Arhitectura RPR 6-7 (1954): 17-30. 
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Figure 5.8 Hunedoara, Exterior view collective dwellings, 1953. Architects Gh. Pavlu et al. (Photo 2008). 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Façade collective dwellings (1953). Ante-project. Architects Gh. Pavlu et al. From AMPH-Igo, 
A-3/18. 
 
The look of the city with its styles of architecture, the fabric of its enclosed 
squares and its picturesque facades suddenly appeared to contrast sharply with the 
representational insertions of the modern from the “Garden City” neighborhood. The 
public space of the third phase (1952-1954) projected by Gheorghe Petrascu, Nicolae 
Porumboiu, and Radu Udroiu was divided into quartals; the city was planned as a single, 
unitary physical ensemble. Using a collective dwelling system and regular grid of arteries 
as the simple, flexible support for a Soviet urban structure, the officials concern relating 
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size and density within the urban perimeter relied on the quartal. The average size, 
estimated at about four hectares, was later recalled as rather small and potentially causing 
unbalanced urban composition and an unhealthy life for the inhabitants.
19
 Meanwhile, the 
project set a density of 280 inhabitants per hectare. There were five-storey buildings and 
green areas; public gardens and parks provided perimeters for family recreation. 
Accordingly, the land was heavily developed, and the buildings were closer together.
20
 
Such elements of urban planning were integrated with other components like modern 
systems of hygiene, running water, transportation, and infrastructure.
21
  
The dwellings, unlike the public buildings previously constructed, served the 
purpose of wholeness with a continuous system of balanced compositions and assemblies 
of public space. The town centre was set for public celebrations and festive parades to 
mark important events in the socialist calendar such as 1 May, 23 August (National Day), 
and 7 November (the anniversary of the Russian Revolution).
22
 In spite of the large scale 
of the building project, the costs employed were minimal. In line with arguments about 
the economic profitability of the socialist city in regard to the previous building attempts, 
the newer plans aimed to integrate construction costs into the planned economy. The total 
cost of the city, including the infrastructure (railways and roads to nearby cities) was 
estimated at 28,525 lei per inhabitant, an amount regarded by the officials an extremely 
profitable for an urban project.
23
 Although the amount cannot be converted to the present-
day currency, it was precisely the profitability issue that helped to distinguish the 
socialist-realist city from the Garden City one. 
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 Marcu, “Aspecte ideologice,” 10. 
20
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Figure 5.10 Ante-project collective dwelling plan with furnishing solutions, 1953. From AMPJ-Igo, A-
2/18. 
 
 
3. A City for Steel:  
Under the socialist regime of the early 1950s, experiencing the city by reading it, and not 
just using it (walking through it, or dwelling and working in it), was a constituent element 
of both building the city and building in the city. As discussed in the third chapter, 
constructing the socialist site‟s meaning was achieved by several methods. One was the 
intensive practice of urbanization, construction and social re-stratification, which the state 
undertook in order to implement a political program of modernization.
24
 Another, related 
to this, was the tendency of the Romanian state to effect changes by the launching of 
“campaigns” accompanied by heavy propaganda. To provide proof that the system 
functioned, the official discourse invariably presented Hunedoara as the winner of these 
competitions.
25
  
                                                 
24
 Clark discusses the centrality of architecture in the Soviet projects of social re-stratification under the 
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25
 Drumul socialismului (17 December 1953): 1. 
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The mechanism was quite simple. In 1951, for example, the party announced a 
national construction program to modernize and implement the socialist project in 
Hunedoara. Citizens were encouraged to help at the building sites, and records mention 
that more than 1,500 out of the 8,600 inhabitants volunteered.
26
 Most of the time, 
individual personalities, transformed overnight into working-class heroes, enlivened a 
space that portrayed the city, and not just the plant, as a “universe of merchandize.”27 
Such figures mediated between the state and the masses. The state supervised the 
volunteer works, which were organized by the Propaganda Department, led by the 
cultural advisor Gheorghe Lupaşcu, and strictly tabulated the results after each effort.28 
The archival holdings on this topic are numerous. Illustrating a sophisticated campaign of 
social integration and mobilization, the documents available in the local and regional 
archives, along with newspaper articles, show how institutional interaction between the 
state and the masses integrated cultural activities in the building program. During their 
monthly meetings, the County Executive Committees discussed citizens‟ involvement in 
the building phases, as well as individual interest in the building program, cultural 
activities conducted by various institutions and types of reward.
29
 Records mention that to 
maintain cultural well-being, the state organized workers‟ meetings with the rest of the 
city‟s population, public lectures and festivals, movie projections and numerous Russian 
song contests.
30
 In spite of the multitude of public activities, which engaged the entire 
local community, most important for the city‟s construction was the central story of 
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personal experiences associated with the project. For instance, during 1953, thanks to 
volunteers like Ciki Ludovic and Darlea Damian, no fewer than 3,000 apartments and 
several educational buildings had been finished and distributed to citizens.
31
 
Published periodically, such data would increase the public‟s curiosity and place 
in the national spotlight individuals who had, typically, worked numerous projects to be 
able to contribute to the program. Much more efficient than real interaction between 
officials and inhabitants, such widely circulated articles about the city, with their graphic 
and photographic content, transformed the space of Hunedoara, and not just its dwellings, 
into an “advertised spectacle.”  The publicity made the city circulate nation wide, as if “it 
suddenly lost mass and volume, while the readers, and not just the inhabitants, consumed 
it.”32 As a direct consequence, citizens throughout the country, as well as those within the 
city, would begin to “see” considerable progress in housing conditions and numerous 
advantages to living inside the city; this in turn was supposed to convince them to move 
to an industrial site. Ideally, individuals most readily would accept the idea of having a 
new house in a new socialist-realist style, and would consider that only the socialist 
ideological construct would grant them such well-being in an urban setting. Once settled 
inside the city, citizens were encouraged to get involved in the daily life of the 
community by advancing ideas about the city, by interacting socially, and by fostering 
cultural solidarities.
33
 Yet, each of these practices in themselves can be rendered 
problematic, as can the relationship between them and the definition of modernity.  
First, the modernity of the space consisted of endowing inhabitants with 
responsibility for the city itself and engaging them actively in the preliminary 
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institutionalized phases of the building process. In 1951, the government demanded that 
local authorities postpone any building project unless it had been previously accepted in a 
public meeting. Regarded as a democratic measure, the idea of consulting civil society on 
issues concerning the community is ubiquitous in any law of urbanism adopted by every 
modern political system around the globe, although how meaningful the consultations 
actually are depends on the society in question. In Hunedoara, workers and inhabitants 
were given the chance to verbalize their visions about the future city. Local officials 
organized public meetings where technicians, architects, workers, and inhabitants 
formulated opinions and concerns about the recently adopted systematization plan.
34
 The 
government‟s representative had to gather their suggestions in writing, and forward the 
minutes to the central institutions. According to the legislative dispositions, within forty-
five days after the public meeting had adjourned, the government had to adopt the final 
version of the systematization plan.
35
  
In theory, institutional involvement of the citizens would facilitate the creation, 
and eventually the evolution, of some architectural products towards a socialist style. By 
the beginning of the 1950s, the campaign to integrate urban space as part of public 
discourse would force the government and the planning offices to take seriously the need 
to explore the multiple possibilities of illustrating socialist-realist architecture as 
“revelatory and creative.”36 Furthermore, the government would conclude that the 
projected socialist-realist city had to respect the topological identity of the space and also 
provide inhabitants with the most appropriate and clear representation of their collective 
urban identity.  
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In reality, the initial emphasis on how the future city should look, rather than on 
how to construct it reveals more about the officials‟ preoccupation to elaborate 
ideologically correct legislative texts and regulations, than about the officials‟ actual 
intent to implement those political decisions. Therefore, although the government 
demanded workers and inhabitants to get involved in the systematization project, there 
could not be found any record of how these wishes shaped the final project, or even about 
any public meeting held in the city around that date.
37
  
Second, since as Beatriz Colomina has pointed out, “the newspaper is an 
instigator, not a table of contents,” the modernity of Hunedoara was achieved by practices 
of urbanization thus delineated new social relations amongst the city‟s inhabitants by 
means of professional integration.
38
 Architectural education was essential to making the 
city readable and at the same time providing enough information to suggest how to read 
the city. Legibility would thus provide legitimacy.
39
  
Initially, in this process of construction and political consolidation, the party 
became, theoretically, the generator of wealth, happiness and national industrial 
development. In 1949, under the party‟s supervision steel production became the 
presumptive cause of general happiness and national fulfillment. That year, production 
had to increase by thirty-five per cent. In Hunedoara, workers like Ilea Ion, Partenie 
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Marisca and Gheorghe Andruţ successfully surpassed the monthly plans.40 However, in 
1950 heavy industry “would have an increase without precedent. Over the following 
months, due to the Soviets‟ help and technological assistance, the total production figures 
would increase by 853 per cent.”41 In the building sector, less “ambitious” investments 
projected an increase by sixty percent, while constructing “the great edifices of culture 
and light.”42 These kinds of enthusiastic phrases, as Jeffrey Brooks has pointed out,  
 
… appeared mainly in commentaries on subjects regarding the working 
class, industrialization, and modernization, and one can recuperate 
something of the intended meaning of socialist realism as it pertained to 
subject, author, and audience within this larger linguistic milieu.
43
  
 
On the one hand, such phrases would endow with political legitimacy several less popular 
social and economic measures initiated by the communist structures, which by 1951 
brought the workers into a state of generalized rejection and tension, initiating strikes and 
protests across the country.
44
 On the other hand, these phrases would carry a 
propagandistic weight because this type of worker - highly-educated, culturally and 
technically, like the rest of individuals who had adopted the Soviet model -  had to find 
different and more efficient means of industrial production.
45
  
The message replaced the real identities with pseudo-identities, which created a 
system of cultural and social representation for the geographical and spatial location of 
the city. For instance, the interaction between Budoy and Atanasiu, which, although 
emblematic for the early stages of communism was just an isolated example in the time‟s 
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newspapers, was in another story taken one step further: Costache Vasile served as 
example not just for his colleagues, but for the entire community. Like a genuine hero, 
Costache Vasile, in line with Soviet methods, managed to increase the daily production 
by more than fifty per cent.
46
 It seemed impossible to put the economy back on its feet 
until Costache Vasile pointed out that all the problems could be solved by employing the 
Soviet methods of production. He was so dedicated that, when the bureaucrats 
undermined his visionary plans for the plant, he put so much trust in the party‟s 
encouragement that he overcame the hardships alone.
47
 Furthermore, in 1953, the 
Stakhanovite Gheorhe Furca identified Hunedoara as the very embodiment of socialist 
success. Furca managed to help production to such an extent that as early as the end of 
1953, he had already been working towards the 1956 industrial plans.
48
 Textually, these 
stories, especially the co-optation of the Stakhavite concept, reveal how Soviet patterns of 
socialist-realist rhetoric had been employed by the Romanian propaganda department. As 
Leonid Heller has pointed out,  
 
… the typical industrial novel of the early 1950s, in which the plot was 
based on the ups and downs of industrial production, would prove 
insufficiently “party minded.” For that, the plot would have to include 
scenes of workers studying and sharpening their skills, transforming 
themselves into a technological intelligentsia.
49
  
 
At this time, the workers‟ personal life experience prior to the establishment of the 
communist regime had no relevance where socialist-realist rhetoric was concerned. The 
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qualities associated with the workers‟ names consisted of values illustrated by their social 
involvement in present-day activities.
50
 
The industrial city was imagined as the ideal place to live because it lived 
Stakhanovites like Costache Vasile and Gheorghe Fulca.
51
 In addition, to make it even 
more convincing, inhabitants agreed in written testimonial to follow the example of 
Stakhanovites in work and life, and to celebrate publicly the party‟s glorious moments 
and the state‟s impressive transformation.52 Officially, the techniques for practicing social 
relations, which were “formed and modulated spatially, and allowed for the efficient 
expansion of power,” increased the urban population.53 According to the National 
Statistic Bulletin, between 1951 and 1954, Hunedoara‟s annual population growth was 
6.9 per cent, the highest in Romania.
54
 Seventy per cent of the inhabitants were migrants, 
originating in other regions of the country, and consequently in great need of dwellings. 
However, the socio-cultural forms built up from disparate elements into a whole should 
be the result of individual creative action instead of external impersonal force. Can 
interpersonal interactions and the ways individuals judged the truthfulness of the 
communist regime be reconstructed, even with access to the local files of the Communist 
Party?  
Thirdly, the Romanian communists tried fashioning solidarities to counter cultural 
challenges posed by existing local traditions by using a combination of industrial 
militancy and neighborhood ties. They employed newspapers or photographs to redraw 
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the boundaries of everyday life. A panoramic photograph of the city, published in 1953 in 
the regional newspaper Drumul socialismului, depicted a continuously developing city 
where public buildings and dwellings coexisted in total harmony, and illustrated the 
socialist nature of the new establishment. In the foreground, the educational buildings – 
the kindergarten and the school – were architecturally depicting the principle of critical 
assimilation of local historic heritage by synthesizing elements of both regional gothic 
and Central European Baroque style. Behind them, the rest of the city depicted the 
socialist content of the communist project through the dwelling assemblies‟ quartal 
planimetry and organization of the facades.
55
 
A fruitful source for reconstructing the interaction between the state and the 
masses as a form of cultural dialogue consisted of letters that the workers were said to 
address to the country‟s leadership and published into in the newspapers periodically. In 
May 1951, Sorin Baeşaru sent a letter to Gheorghiu-Dej to stress his enthusiasm for 
having received a new house and a decent salary.
56
 To some extent, the everlasting 
parallel between socialist and western world was maintained; here, though, it formed on 
the daily experience of Soviet life, which was depicted as much superior to the occidental 
one.
57
 The city, therefore, was seen not just as an accommodation perimeter. It coincided 
with a process of personal evolution and progress. In 1953, another worker explains in 
detail his movement from an insalubrious house into a modern home, which, in return for 
his involvement in industrial work, the party offered him. The city was shown to be 
capable of producing general sentiments of optimism and facilitating the imposition of a 
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social order, an educational and value system, unaltered by any harmful influence.
58
 
Architecture, therefore, insofar as it was directly linked to the reality of production, was 
able to create an ideological climate to integrate the design fully into a comprehensive 
state project that reorganized production, distribution, and reception, and controlled the 
inhabitants‟ behavior inside the city. The citizens were made aware that they were 
privileged enough to dwell in one of the most important industrial centers of the country 
and, within the newspapers‟ pages, they made no secret of that.59 
During the Labor Day celebration of 1 May 1953, flags, flowers, and pictures of 
Marx, Engels, Stalin and Lenin, as well as those of Gheorghiu-Dej, adorned the public 
squares and the dwelling ensembles. The meeting was organized in Freedom Square 
(Piata Libertăţii) where thousands of workers applauded the hard-working workers.60 The 
anniversary celebration opened with a show of Russian music and poems, continued with 
sequences of Russian dances. The climax of the ceremonies was the parade of the 
Stakhanovites Costache Vasile, Gheorghe Furca, Gheorghe Nemes, and Ion Haulica. The 
project was intended not just as housing, but about the forging of identities by means of 
the urban experience.
61
 The constant references to Gheorghiu-Dej and Stalin in the 
context of city-building appeared to contemporary readers as something of a formula 
reiterated periodically. Gheorghiu-Dej was presented as Stalin‟s disciple, following his 
example and trying to implement his teachings. Gheorghiu-Dej expressed the 
paternalistic concern the party had manifested while enlivening the words of Stalin, 
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which made possible “the building of the newest and lightest dwellings in the city.”62 By 
the end of 1951, the institutionalized system began to solidify; on these grounds the 
politicians manipulated the ideological significance of the city and of the new housing in 
terms of their potential to redress historic wrongs. No longer was the city the domain of 
the bourgeoisie; the space was reclaimed in a great program of socialist engineering 
where the city built here reflected the very Stalinist principle “man was the most precious 
capital.”63  
The way this familiar texture of working-class collective life – the banners, the 
songs, the houses of culture, the social events organized by ARLUS – was set into place 
demonstrates the degree to which this collective life was articulated into an explicitly 
political identity. Socialist realism used the concept of modernization as a model of social 
integration based on patterns of cultural practices that were organized around economic 
principles that might resemble what Alan Swingewood defined as “a highly rationalized 
system of cultural production which socialized individuals effectively in a state of 
ideological conformism.”64 Emphasis was placed on urban public space as sites for 
political celebration and the personal development of each individual within the social 
collective. For this strategy to succeed, moreover, the state had to create individuals who 
were capable of understanding consciously the ideological subtleties of this new urban 
space. 
 
 
 
                                                 
62
 Drumul socialismului (6 May 1954): 2; see also, idem (26 March 1951): 1; idem (8 May 1951): 1.  
63
 Drumul socialismului  (15 January 1951): 1; idem (5 February 1951): 1, idem (16 August 1951): 2.  
64
 Alan Swingewood, Cultural Theory and the Problem of Modernity (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998),   
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Conclusion:  
Adopting the Five Year Plan in 1951 provided the prerequisites for the bureaucratization 
of public life, meaning the reevaluation of architects‟ positions and attributes within the 
relationship between “architects, planners, and their client, the State.”65 Therefore, the 
specific form that the city took was tied to the activities of political elites and dependent 
on both institutional unity and decision-making coherence within the party organization. 
Furthermore, the construction of the city occurred simultaneously with the consolidation 
of political power within the communist system and solidified definitively the assumption 
that architecture was and had to be the outcome product of this fully institutionalized 
system.          
                                                 
65
 Crowley, “Warsaw Interiors: The Public Life of Private Spaces, 1949-65,” 186. 
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VI 
Conclusion  
This research project examined the evolution of Romania‟s postwar intended 
modernization process under the influence of communist institutional practices imposed 
by the USSR. The research began from the assumption that the built environment plays a 
fundamental role in shaping the collective social consciousness and, that Soviet style 
urban design, therefore, had the potential to become a viable instrument in the attempts 
undertaken by a certain political regime to establish its legitimacy. The thesis concerned 
itself with the official discourse elaborated by the communist structures and its impact on 
the building dynamic; it did not aim to provide real, concrete social interactions within 
the newly-established socialist society. Therefore, these findings should be contextualized 
within the wider study of propaganda production, as opposed to reception, in Romanian 
especially and the Soviet Union‟s Eastern bloc as a whole.  
Inside the communist system, the ability to define “modernity” much less 
bringing it into being, depended on whether political elites and the party could provide 
institutional unity and coherent decision-making. In Romania, they could not, at least 
until around 1952. Before then, political fragmentation, ideological contradictions, and 
fights for power dominated the Romanian public life and affected, among other things, 
the production of propaganda, architectural or otherwise. Furthermore, the political 
conflict illustrated in the previous chapters did not carry a consistent ideological debate, 
was dominated by individual disagreements. Therefore, most of the political events 
should be regarded closely linked with the political evolution of the party‟s Secretary 
General Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. These problems also damaged the potential of 
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building projects like the Hunedoara expansion. Therefore, although politicians tried to 
use architectural institutions to mediate between the state and the citizens, architecture‟s 
overall capacity to accomplish constructive tasks was substantially diminished. Until the 
early 1950s, the institutional dynamic essential for the construction of socialist realism 
embraced the entire range of the state‟s decision-making structures such as financial 
organizations and political forces, and not just those belonging to a few cultural 
establishments, such as ARLUS, the Propaganda Department, or the mass media. During 
the late 1940s, these various actors were pursuing different goals. Propagandists and 
cultural institutions were concerned with conforming to Stalinist ideological parameters, 
while political and economic bodies occupied themselves more with searching for 
potential ways to build communism. With the start of the Five Year Plan in 1951, public 
life sufficiently was bureaucratized and political power sufficiently centralized, to permit 
greater coherence, both in terms of rhetoric and decision-making.  
Nevertheless, building projects like Hunedoara were vulnerable to changing 
ideological language. If judged from the perspective of the ideological orientation of 
1959, the urban development plan in Hunedoara “could be characterized as being 
obviously formalistic.”1 After 1954, architecture followed a new road. In an address 
delivered in December 1954 at the meeting of the Union of Soviet Architects, the new 
Soviet leader Khrushchev condemned the building practices that had characterized 
Stalinist projects but not the ideology that animated them.
2
 Khrushchev condemned 
excessive decoration and the waste of financial resources on superfluous architectural 
enterprises. The effect of Khrushchev‟s comments was quickly felt in the Popular 
                                                 
1
 Marcus, “Sistematizarea,” 20. 
2
 On the political context in which the discourse was delivered, see Cooke, “Beauty as a Route.”  
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Democracies: his speech was translated in Romanian in 1955 and published by the review 
Arhitectura.
3
 Consequently, a new urban development plan was elaborated in Hunedoara, 
by the mid-1950s. In this case, unlike in previous plans, the schemes respected the 
internal organization of the space as well as the building typology, but were striped of 
any decorative elements. This choice reconfirmed that, within the communist system, 
architectural creation was subject to strict political control and governmental strategies. 
 
Figure 6.1 View of the former Hunedoara Steel Plant. (Photo 2008). 
On the long term, the Steel Plant that had been closely linked to the development of the 
city reached by the end of the 1980s more than 30,000 employees, and quickly declined 
afterwards during the post-socialist era. The communist program of modernization to 
                                                 
3
 N. Khrushchev, “Despre introducerea pe scară largă a metodelor industriale, imbunataţirea calitaţii şi 
reducerea costului construcţiilor,” Arhitectura RPR 2 (1955): 31-36. 
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which both the Steel Plant and the city rhetorically subscribed, and where history and 
vernacular heritage supposedly fueled the legitimizing discourse, survived as long as the 
communist regime was all mighty.  
From the continuous interaction of institutional and ideological rhetoric, new 
research questions arise. On one hand, it would be interesting to study individual 
reactions to the built environment. How did urban designs affect people‟s daily 
experience of the quotidian features of life under communism? On the other hand, 
stressing institutional evolution and, researching the impact of socialist realism upon the 
architectural profession (or, more broadly, upon artistic circles) could uncover the steps 
taken by both the state and professionals to adapt an artistic vocabulary to new Soviet 
rhetoric. It would also be fruitful to examine the professional evolution of individual 
artists inside the socialist system or the forced exile of others. The connections and 
collaborations of Romanian architects with their European peers during the late 1950s 
and the whole 1960s would be worth investigating as well.  
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